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Abstract Based on a database of 326 merger cases scrutinized by
the European Commission (EC) between 1990 and 2007, we evaluate
the economic impact of the change in European merger legislation in
2004. We first propose a general framework to assess merger policy ef-
fectiveness, which is based on standard oligopoly theory and makes use
of stock market reactions as an external assessment of the merger and
the merger control decision. We then focus on four different dimensions
of effectiveness: 1) legal certainty; 2) frequency and determinants of
type I and type II errors; 3) rent-reversion achieved by different merger
policy tools; and 4) deterrence of anti-competitive mergers. To infer the
economic impact of the merger policy reform, we compare the results of
our four tests before and after its introduction. Our results suggest that
the new approach of the EC, which is more firmly anchored on economic
principles, resulted in a better identification of problematic cases, a re-
duction of type II errors, and a slight increase in remedies effectiveness.
However, the predictability of outright clearances has initially decreased.
Finally, the policy shift away from prohibitions that was reinforced after
the introduction of the reform does not seem to be well grounded.
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Introduction
By reforming the present merger control system as radically as
needed, therefore, I am determined to ensure that it remains a key
instrument to foster Europe’s economic success in the years ahead.
Mario Monti, EU Commissioner for Competition, 7 November 2002
The modernization package of European merger control, initiated in 1999,
led to the adoption of Council Regulation 139/2004 in May 2004 (ECMR 04).
Several observers interpreted this major institutional change as a shock reac-
tion to events that had happened in the early 2000s, when three prohibition
decisions of the Directorate General for Competition (DG Comp) were over-
ruled by the Court of First Instance (CFI).1 In all three successful appeals,
the CFI identified the main problems as being related to the rigor of eco-
nomic analysis conducted by DG Comp and the standard of proof the decision
was based upon. While these reverses certainly were an indicator of the need
for reform, they were not the cause: A Green Paper calling for a revision of
European merger law had been published as early as December 2001.
One of the major goals of the merger policy reform was to achieve what
became known as a ’more economic approach’ in merger control, i.e. an ap-
proach closer to economic principles. Numerous important changes were made
along these lines: an efficiency defense clause was introduced, the office of the
chief economist and his team were created, the timetable for remedies was im-
proved, guidelines for horizontal mergers were issued, and the old ’dominance
test’ (DT) was abandoned in favor of the ’significant impediment of effective
competition test’ (SIEC).2 This last point is probably the most substantive
change introduced by the reform. The main problem with the old DT was
that it worked as a cumulative two-part test. A merger was to be declared
incompatible with the common market if it ’creates or strengthens a dominant
1The cases in question are Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra
Laval/Sidel.
2Lyons (2004) discusses these reforms in greater detail. The problems with the DT and
the advantages of the SIEC are summed up in Vickers (2004).
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position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly im-
peded’. This implies that – as was later confirmed by the CFI – the second
part of the test, the impediment of effective competition, only applied if the
criterion of the first part, the creation of a dominant position, was met. Merg-
ers reducing effective competition without the creation of a dominant position
could not be challenged under the old legislation, whereas the creation of a
dominant position is no longer a necessary condition for intervention by DG
Comp post-reform.
The reception of the ECMR 04 was generally favorable. Commentators
expected the quality and effectiveness of the decisions to improve due to the
new approach, which enables a more flexible analysis closer to economic prin-
ciples. Yet, some commentators feared that the cost of increased flexibility
stemming from the adoption of more sophisticated tools in the assessment of
unilateral effects and efficiency gains could be a loss in predictability of the
merger control process.
Several years have passed since the introduction of the new merger regula-
tion, enough time to make the first assessment of its effects. In this paper, we
propose a comprehensive approach to empirically evaluate whether the mod-
ernization of European merger control has succeeded in attaining the goal of
increasing its effectiveness. We analyze 326 mergers covering most major cases
scrutinized by DG Comp until December 2007 to empirically assess the eco-
nomic impact of the change in legislation and institutions brought about by
the new ECMR 04. We base our evaluation exercise on a number of maintained
theoretical assumptions coming from standard merger theory in an oligopolis-
tic setting (e.g. Farrell and Shapiro (1990)) and the use of stock-market event
studies to measure the effect of mergers and merger control decisions. From
this starting point, we propose four dimensions of effectiveness of EU merger
policy: predictability, decision errors, rent-reversion, and deterrence. For each
of these, we adopt a before-and-after approach to single out the effects of the
reform.
First, we test the predictability of the European merger control procedure.
We estimate a simple probit model, where the decisions of DG Comp are a
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function of observable characteristics. Consistent with previous studies (e.g.
Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007), Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), and Duso,
Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011)), we find that several institutional and procedu-
ral variables play a significant role in explaining the Commission’s decision-
making. We find evidence that the ability to predict interventions has not
been affected by the introduction of the reform, while the ability to predict an
outright clearance has decreased.
Next we assess whether the introduction of the new merger regulation has
influenced the frequency and determinants of systematic mistakes made by
the EU Commission (EC).3 Following Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), we
initially assess the competitive consequences of the mergers using the abnormal
stock market returns of competitors to the merging firms. We define cases in
which DG Comp remedied a merger that the stock market regarded as pro-
competitive (type I errors) as well as instances in which the EC failed to
remedy mergers that were regarded as anti-competitive (type II errors). We
observe that the overall frequency of errors did not significantly change after
the reform. Yet, the EC’s more pro-active attitude after the reform produced
a shift toward more type I and fewer type II errors. In phase 2, however,
it appears that the EC has become too lenient, since type II errors increase
during this investigation phase compared to pre-reform.
In a third step, we estimate the degree of rent-reversion induced by the
different merger control instruments used by DG Comp. Under a set of main-
tained assumptions, the relation between the abnormal returns around the
announcement of a merger and those around the EC’s decision can be inter-
preted to indicate the success of merger policy in eliminating anti-competitive
rents created by a merger (see Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011)). While we
find statistically significant full rent-reversion for prohibitions pre-reform, we
do not find such reversion for remedies prior to ECMR 04. We cannot estimate
the effects of prohibitions after the reform since there are so few, however, we
find weak evidence that remedies have become more effective.
3The terms DG Comp and European Commission (or EC) will be used interchangeably
throughout this paper.
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Finally, we look at a fourth dimension of effectiveness, which is related
to the indirect or deterrent effects of merger control.4 An effective competi-
tion policy should induce firms to obey antitrust rules and, hence, deter firms
from proposing anti-competitive mergers. Thus, we estimate the probability
of a merger to be anti-competitive as a function of past EC decisions. This
is a novel approach and adds to the (limited) existing literature that has only
looked at whether merger policy tools affect the number of notified mergers
(Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros (2009)) or the proportion of horizontal to
total mergers (Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2010)). We find that, pre-reform,
prohibitions as well as phase-1 remedies have a deterrence effect on the like-
lihood of proposing an anti-competitive merger. Post-reform, the deterrence
properties of blockings is replaced by the deterrence effects of withdrawn or
aborted mergers. This finding might be explained by the policy shift away from
prohibitions. This process, whose beginning does not necessarily coincide with
the introduction of ECMR 04 has continued after the reform following the idea
that remedies are a superior policy instrument to blockings.
Combining event study methodology with econometrics – an approach pi-
oneered by Ellert (1976) – has proven to be a fruitful empirical methodology
in the assessment of business combinations and merger policy.5 Whereas tra-
ditional techniques rely on indirect measures of market power such as concen-
tration ratios or subjective measures of the importance of entry barriers and
the prospect for coordinated effects, the event study approach allows us to di-
rectly compute an independent evaluation of the merger and the merger control
decision.6 However, the legitimacy of the event study approach in evaluating
mergers has been put into question since it itself presents several shortcomings.
4As pointed out by Sørgard (2009), an optimal merger policy entails deterrence, i.e. the
effect a decision has on firms’ future merger behavior.
5The event study analysis of mergers was first extended to rivals by Eckbo (1983) and
Stillman (1983). Una and Feinberg (2000), Aktas, De Bodt, and Roll (2004), Aktas, de Bodt,
and Roll (2007), Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), and Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011)
use this methodology to evaluate EU merger control.
6Monti (2008) discusses how stock market reactions could be incorporated into the EC’s
decisions.
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Criticisms predominantly include the role of expectations and externalities in
stock market data (e.g. McAfee (1988) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2010)).
We recognize the validity of these criticisms and propose several ways to deal
with them. First, our sample yields a particularly accurate assessment of the
rivals’ identity, since Commission experts have carefully identified the relevant
product market for every merger. We therefore reduce the potential bias to-
ward zero of the abnormal returns earned by rivals as a group, which would be
caused by including firms that are not fundamentally affected by the merger.
Second, the merger’s announcements and the Commission’s decisions might
reveal information other than the pure competitive or profitability effect of
the event, such as the effect of industry shocks triggering a merger wave, fu-
ture acquisition probability, and the information about the allocation of the
roles of insiders and outsiders. We tackle these issues twofold. We carefully
choose the announcement date and the appropriate event window to reduce
the influence of other triggering shocks and, even more importantly, we correct
for the expectations of market participants about the merger proceedings prior
to events. By conditioning on the merger-specific information available around
the merger announcement, our correction for the market expectations should
help us insulate the pure surprise element for any specific event and, hence,
help to measure the competitive effect of the merger and the merger control
decision. Finally, we conduct a comprehensive series of robustness tests to
derive consistent evidence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is concerned with our basic frame-
work, the methodology and main assumptions. Section 3 presents the sources
of the data, some summary statistics, and the estimations of the merger and
merger control decision effects by means of stock-market event studies. Sec-
tion 4 presents the results of the probability of intervention estimation, the
analysis of the frequency and determinants of type I and type II errors, the
rent-reversion regressions, and the deterrence regressions respectively. Section
5 concludes.
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Methodology
This section provides a unified framework for assessing merger control. This
framework is then used to discuss our four dimensions of effectiveness via
empirical tests, which have been partially developed in our previous work (e.g.
Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007) and Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011)) and
are partially newly designed in this paper. The objective of our analysis is to
use this general framework to measure the impact of the modernization package
of European merger control by comparing the periods pre-reform (January
1990 to May 2004) and post-reform (June 2004 to the end of 2007).7
The starting point of our methodology is that merger control aims at
avoiding anti-competitive (i.e. consumer welfare decreasing) mergers by ei-
ther blocking or remedying them or by deterring them. One of the main
challenges in the empirical assessment of merger control is the ability to, first,
define and, second, measure the anti-competitive nature of a merger. Next,
we clearly state the assumptions needed to address these identification and
quantification issues.
Assumptions
Theoretical Identification
We define an anti-competitive merger as one that reduces consumer welfare.8
Our basic setting is a standard static merger model in oligopolistic markets.
The well-documented result of this literature is that mergers exert two exter-
nalities on rivals. The market power effect captures the impact of the reduction
in competition brought about by a combination, absent any efficiency gains
7We chose the date in which the new merger regulation legally came into force to define
the pre- and post- reform periods. However in section , we discuss this issue and the
robustness of our results to the choice of a different date.
8In this paper we assume that the antitrust agency has a consumer-welfare standard,
which is the standard adopted by the European Commission as well as most other compe-
tition authorities. Thus, we will not discuss the "right" welfare criterion in merger control.
For such a discussion see Motta (2004) and Neven and Röller (2005).
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(Stigler (1950)). For instance, in a Cournot setting, when a subset of firms in
the market merges and jointly maximizes profits, they find it optimal to reduce
their production. Under mild assumptions, this effect triggers the response of
the remaining market participants to increase their production but by less than
the merging firms. Hence, aggregate market output in the post-merger situa-
tion decreases, price rises, and consumer welfare is lower (Farrell and Shapiro
(1990)). A similar mechanism generates price increases of merging firms and
rivals and a reduction of consumer welfare in models where firms compete in
prices and goods are differentiated (Deneckere and Davidson (1985)). Hence,
a horizontal merger creates a positive externality for the competitors of the
merging firms: via the "price umbrella" it increases their profits. The second
externality, called the efficiency effect (Williamson (1968)), relies on the as-
sumption of merger-specific synergies: Economies of scale, knowledge sharing,
patent-pooling, etc., allow the merged entity to produce more efficiently than
before, increasing the competitive pressure on its rivals and thus exerting a
negative externality on them.
In most mergers both effects co-exist and what matters for welfare is the net
effect of these antipodal forces. As Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show, there exists
a critical level of efficiency gains such that the market power effect is exactly
compensated for and the new equilibrium price and aggregate production is the
same pre- and post-merger.9 Looking at this net effect thus allows us to infer
the competitive nature of a merger. When the positive externalities exceed the
negative externalities, i.e. the efficiency gains are not enough to compensate
for the market power effect, rivals’ profits increase, while consumer surplus
decreases, since prices are higher than before the merger. The first identify-
ing assumption of our framework is, therefore, that a post-merger increase in
competitors’ profits is an indication of the merger being anti-competitive.
This identification assumption is quite general and robust and holds for a
wide class of oligopoly models. However, it could prove problematic in some
circumstances such as vertical or conglomerate mergers and mergers in a dy-
9Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that these efficiency gains have to be rather substantial
to outweigh the market power effect.
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namic context. Vertical mergers may cause market foreclosure, where both
rivals and, potentially, consumers lose depending on the parametrization of the
demand function, thereby violating our identification assumption concerning
the nature of the merger. In a more general dynamic model, where horizontal
merger proposals are endogenous and come over time and an antitrust author-
ity can set its optimal policy (Nocke and Whinston (2010)), the holding of our
assumption depends on the nature of the sequence of mergers and the merger
policy. We therefore control for the merger wave and the horizontal nature of
the merger in our regressions. As a further robustness check that we discuss
in section , we exclude from our sample mergers that are not purely horizontal
and obtain qualitatively similar results as for the whole sample.
Empirical Measurement
The next step is to measure the profitability effects brought about by the
merger and merger control decision. Following an extensive literature, we do
that by using stock market reactions to the merger’s and decision’s announce-
ments, i.e. a stock-market event study.10 This methodology relies on the
semi-strong version of the efficient capital market hypothesis, which asserts
that stock prices fully reflect the information available to the market on the
given commodity at any point in time. This implies that it is not possible to
outperform the market index using commonly available information, or, more
formally, that the daily return of a commodity i (Ri,t) is proportional to the
market index (Rmarket,t) at any given point in time t:
Ri,t = α + βRmarket,t + εi,t (1)
where εi,t is an i.i.d. error term. The idea that markets are information-
ally efficient is central to the entire event-study literature starting from Fama
(1970) and constitutes our second crucial assumption.
10As reported by Kothari and Warner (2007), by the end of 2006, there were more than
500 published papers utilizing the event study methodology in different areas of economics.
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Under this assumption, model (1) can be used to estimate the ’normal’
return of a firm at any given point in time as R̂i,t = α̂ + β̂Rmarket,t. When
observing a stock market reaction to the announcement of a particular event
(e.g. a merger or a merger control decision), the change in the equity value
(with respect to the ’normal’ value) of firms affected by this event can then be
taken as a measure of the (discounted) additional profits that are expected to
accrue as a consequence of the event. This stock reaction, also called abnormal
return, can be seen as a measure of the profitability of such an event and can
be measured as ARi,t = Ri,t− R̂i,t. Since there might be information leakages,
which influence firm i’s return before (or after) the merger announcement, the
total valuation effect of the event is defined as the sum of the daily abnormal
returns within a window of several days around the event: the cumulative
abnormal return (CAR). Finally, we aggregate these measures to obtain a
profitability measure for the merging firms and the competitors by taking a
weighted sum of the individual CARs, where the weights are represented by
the relative market value of each firm. We call these measures "cumulative
aggregate abnormal returns" (CAARs).11
The measured CAARs around a merger’s announcement (or the EC’s de-
cision) also might entail effects other than the pure competitive effects and, in
particular, the effects of specific forces triggering the merger (e.g. Jovanovic
and Rousseau (2002)), information about the roles of merging firms and ri-
vals (e.g. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2010)), and the market expectations about
the outcome of the merger control decision (Eckbo (1992)). Hence, the third
important assumption of our methodology is that we can effectively control
for the merger’s triggering events and the allocation of roles, by choosing the
right announcement dates and event windows. We use the date of the first
merger-specific rumors in the business press as the merger announcement (e.g.
Banerjee and Eckard (1998). The surprise element to the stock market is likely
to be largest around this date, since the likelihood that the merger is already
anticipated is still low. Moreover, using the merger-specific rumors coupled
11In the appendix, we provide a formal derivation and a discussion of the CAARs.
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with a large event window should help us to control for the uncertainty in the
allocation of the roles (acquirer, target, rival). In particular, we consider dif-
ferent event windows for the various events to account for different information
leakages. For the merger announcement, we use a long window of 50 trading
days before the event’s date and 5 days after.12 For the phase 1 decision, we
use a short window of 11 days (-5, +5), since information leakages are likely
to be modest before the phase 1 decision given the strict timing procedure of
the EU merger control. For a phase 2 decision, however, we again use the long
window of 56 days (-50, +5) to account for information leakages due to the
investigation and negotiation process during that phase (see also Appendix ).
Finally, to tackle the issue of market expectations about the merger pro-
ceedings, we estimate the probability of intervention and use it to correct
our CAAR measures. The logic of this correction is as follows: The stock
market builds expectations on the likely outcome of the antitrust procedure,
which should already be priced in the stocks of merging firms and rivals at
the announcement of a merger. Thus, neither at the announcement nor at the
decision we do measure the whole extent of the rents generated by the merger
or the whole effect of the EC’s decision, but only an update of the market’s
beliefs. We thus have to adjust the measured abnormal returns for the ex-
pectations of the stock market. An (extreme) example of a prohibition might
clarify the intuition. If we measure a rent of 100 million US dollars around the
merger announcement, but the ex ante expectation of the market is that the
EC will block this merger with a probability of 20%, the full extent of rents
is actually (100/(1 − 0.2)) = US$125 million. See Appendix for a detailed
formal derivation. Given our setup, we are then confident that the corrected
CAARs around merger j’s announcement A (ΠA∗fj ) can be seen as a meaningful
measure of the competitive effects of the merger on merging firms (f = M)
12Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010), with a sub-sample of our data, show that the cu-
mulative abnormal returns calculated using this large window correlate positively and sig-
nificantly with an alternative ex-post measure of profitability based on accounting data.
The correlation is, instead, much lower and, in the case of rivals, even negative when using
shorter event windows.
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or competitors (f = C), while the corrected CAARs around the EC’s decision
(D) on merger j (ΠD∗fj ) can be seen as a meaningful measure of the effect of
the decision on the group f ’s profitability.
A final assumption, which is however only needed in the rent-reversion test,
is that the market power and efficiency effects of a merger can, at least partially,
be separated by an effective antitrust action: Well-implemented remedies im-
posed by the EC should eliminate the market power effect while preserving the
efficiency gains generated by the merger. All of these assumptions as well as
the consequences of their failure are discussed in length and justified in greater
detail in Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011).
Assessing Policy Effectiveness
The innovation and main contribution of this paper is to assess the economic
impact of the introduction of ECMR 04. To achieve this goal, we look at four
different dimensions of effectiveness and explicitly analyze the differences in the
performance of the EC before and after the 2004 reform. These dimensions of
policy effectiveness can be seen in a natural chronological order. First, before
the announcement of a merger, legal certainty and predictability of the merger
control procedure are important determinants of firms’ choices on the kind of
merger they propose and, hence, total welfare. Therefore, our first test analyzes
the determinants of interventions by DG Comp to infer its predictability. The
second event we look at is the EC decision. An effective policy should reduce
mistakes; thus, we analyze the frequency and determinants of type I and type
II errors committed by the EC. Third, it is not only important whether the EC
intervenes in the ’right’ mergers, but also whether its intervention achieves the
desired results. Thus, we look at effectiveness as measured by the degree of
rent-reversion achieved by the different merger policy instruments. Finally, a
particular decision might have consequences on the future merger behavior of
other firms. We therefore analyze the deterrence effects of the EC’s decisions
by estimating how past interventions affect the competitive nature of currently
proposed mergers.
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If the reform was successful in making merger policy more effective, we
would expect (1) an increase in the predictability of the merger control out-
come, (2) a reduction in the frequency of mistakes (decision errors), (3) a larger
degree of rent-reversion achieved by remedies, and finally, (4) a higher degree
of deterrence of anti-competitive mergers.
Legal Certainty, Transparency, and Predictability
The predictability of the merger control procedures is a key issue for judges,
competition lawyers, authorities and, of course, the firms. Since legal cer-
tainty and transparency of the proceedings reduce the welfare-detrimental risk
of political influence and decrease uncertainty for the firms, the desirability
of a merger control system comprised of clear-cut, transparent and traceable
rules and proceedings has long been stressed by scholars and practitioners (e.g.
Smith (1957) and Elman (1965)). The benefits of legal certainty known to the
literature are numerous: it increases the credibility of the authorities by en-
couraging them to base their decisions on accurate facts and sound economic
reasoning, making their rulings more consistent and fair. It fosters accountabil-
ity and reduces personal biases in the decision process. It allows the concerned
firms to better understand the merger review process and predict its outcome
with a certain reliability, thereby discouraging them from proposing clearly
welfare-reducing mergers.13 Thus, a predictable merger control process reduces
the high costs and reputation losses entailed by a lengthy antitrust procedure
(Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright (1993)). Moreover, the transparency of legal
procedures increases the potential for harmonization among multiple regula-
tory authorities. Transparency can, however, also entail costs (McAfee (2010)).
By encouraging simple rules it might lead to repeated consistent errors, which
could be avoided by using more flexible, case-by-case criteria allowed by a
rule-of-reason approach. It increases the costs borne by antitrust authorities
13In a slightly different setting, Barros (2003) theoretically proves that an increase in the
uncertainty of the antitrust policy’s implementation leads to more anti-competitive agree-
ments to be proposed by firms.
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by imposing them to disclose the outcomes and the economic and legal reason-
ing motivating their decisions. Finally, it might also delay innovations in the
adoption of more sophisticated and precise assessment techniques by creating
path dependency with respect to past decisions.
Yet, a balance of these costs and benefits reveals undoubtedly that trans-
parency, especially with concern to the process underlying antitrust evaluation,
is desirable.14 The transparency of the proceedings of a competition authority
can be classified on the basis of the comprehensiveness and public availability
of documents containing the economic reasoning in merger cases, guidelines
for their handling, and detailed statistics. In general, the level of transparency
of European merger control has been found to be laudable in comparison with
that of other competition authorities (e.g. Gelfand and Calsyn (2005)).15
The impact of ECMR 04 on the predictability of merger decisions, however,
is ex ante ambiguous. On the one hand, the publication of merger guidelines
and several institutional changes were clearly aimed at augmenting legal cer-
tainty. On the other hand, the more intensive use of specific theoretical and
econometric tools, aimed at accurately pinning down the specificities of each
14Shapiro (2010), for instance, reports that the US Assistant Attorney General "explained
[...] that a major goal of revising the [US merger] Guidelines [in 2010] was to provide greater
transparency [...] and reduce the gaps between the Guidelines and actual agency practice–
gaps in the sense of both omissions of important factors that help predict the competitive
effects of mergers and statements that are either misleading or inaccurate."
15DG Competition itself is concerned with the transparency and predictability of its pro-
ceedings. For instance, a press release on January, 6, 2010 reports: "Detailed explanations
concerning how European Commission antitrust procedures work in practice have just been
published by the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) and
the Hearing Officers on the Europa website in order to further enhance the transparency
and the predictability of Commission antitrust proceedings. The explanations are outlined
in three documents, namely Best Practices for antitrust proceedings, Best Practices for the
submission of economic evidence (both in antitrust and merger proceedings) and Guidance
on the role of the Hearing Officers in the context of antitrust proceedings. The documents
will make it easier for companies under investigation to understand how the investigation will
proceed, what they can expect from the Commission and what the Commission will expect
from them." (see: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/2)
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single case, makes singular decisions more difficult to be anticipated, since
the decision process is less anchored on simple, general rules (e.g. Kobayashi
(1997)).16
As discussed by Voigt and Schmidt (2005), predictability can be defined as
the "capacity to make predictions concerning the actions of others that have
a high chance of turning out to be correct." Before proposing a concentration,
the involved firms should be able to predict to a large extent the reaction of
the competition authority on the basis of observable characteristics related to
the merger. Therefore, one testable implication of legal certainty in merger
control is the predictability of the EC’s decisions.17
Thus let Pj be the actual decision taken by the agency on merger j, which
is equal to 1 when the merger is remedied or blocked, which we will call action,
and zero otherwise (clear). Let Xj be a set of observable characteristics related
to the specific merger. These might be characteristics of the merging firms,
the product and geographical markets where they operate, the nature of the
merger they propose, as well as the merger policy history up to the point in
time when merger j is proposed. We measure the predictability of the decision
on the basis of goodness of fit measures of the following regression:18
Pj = α0 + α1Xj + εj (2)
16As noted by Christiansen (forthcoming): "[...] with the simultaneous introduction of
unilateral effects analysis and the ’efficiency defense’, it is possible not only for mergers
’below’ the previously relevant market dominance threshold to be prohibited but also for
mergers ’above’ it to be approved. This boils down to a wider margin of discretion in
decision-making, thus making the Commission’s decisions permanently more difficult to
predict."
17Similar analyses have been performed by Bergman, Jakobsson, and Razo (2005), and
Bougette and Turolla (2006). Yet, the logic of their work is not motivated by the concept of
predictability but rather by the aim of providing a test of whether the antitrust authorities
give appropriate weights to the factors that they regard as important ex ante, such as market
shares, concentration, and barriers to entry.
18We assume that the error terms εj are correlated over time, so we cluster them at the
year level.
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We would expect changes in legal certainty to be accompanied by changes
in the predictive power of model (2), measured by standard statistics such as
the pseudo−R2, the percentage of correct predictions, the sensitivity (i.e. the
proportion of actual positives (here interventions) which are correctly identi-
fied), and the specificity (i.e. the proportion of actual negatives (here outright
clearances) which are correctly identified).
Type I and Type II Errors
The first assessment of a particular decision is whether it conforms to the
objectives of merger control and, hence, whether the Commission committed
mistakes. According to our discussion in section , a benevolent agency inter-
venes in a merger if and only if consumer surplus (CS) would be reduced, hence
the optimal decision rule for merger j is:
Dj =
0 (clear) iff CSj ≥ 01 (intervention) iff CSj < 0
Let Pj again be the actual decision taken by the agency on merger j, which
is equal to 1 if the merger is remedied or blocked, and zero otherwise. We say
a type I error occurs if the agency intervenes in a merger that should have
been cleared without commitments, i.e. E1j = 1 if Pj = 1 and Dj = 0, else
0, and a type II error when the agency clears a merger that should have been
blocked or remedied, i.e. E2j = 1 if Pj = 0 and Dj = 1, else 0.19 In order to
measure E1j and E2j, we need to measure Dj, which requires an estimate
of the impact of the merger on consumer surplus. Under our maintained
assumptions, consumer surplus decreases after the merger if the profits of the
rivals to the merging firms increase. Hence, the consumer welfare-maximizing
merger control decision is:
19The notion of type I errors we use here corresponds therefore to the weak type I errors
in Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007). Given that prohibitions were a very rare event in the
entire sample and, especially, in the post-reform period, it would be impossible to perform
any econometric analysis on the strong type I errors, i.e. pro-competitive mergers which
were blocked. We will come back to this important point in section .
20
Dj = 1 if ΠA∗Cj > 0
where ΠA∗Cj represents the corrected merger announcement CAARs of the
competitors (C) for merger j.20 Once we have defined type I and type II errors,
we analyze their determinants by running the following probit regressions:
E1j = α0 + α1Xj + εj if Dj = 1 (3)
E2j = β0 + β1Xj + εj if Dj = 0 (4)
Clearly, if the agency is benevolent, then both errors should be completely
random and, hence, neither the determinants Xj nor the constants α0 and
β0 should have significant explanatory power to predict them. However, in
a political economy model of merger control (e.g. Neven and Röller (2005)),
the antitrust agency maximizes an objective function containing not only the
welfare of the economy but also the additional utility that it can obtain from
third parties. These include the involved firms and other agents such as mem-
ber states’ governments, which provide contingent perks or, more generally,
other kinds of private benefits. The determinants of errors Xj are thus merger-
specific characteristics and institutional and political economy variables that
may influence the decision of an antitrust agency (see Duso, Neven, and Röller
(2007)).
In this political economy context, the gains generated by the merger for
the merging firms and their rivals can be seen as the amount of resources that
these firms are willing to pay to obtain their preferred outcome.21 One would
expect type I errors to decrease with the gains of the merging firms, as they
are interested in obtaining a clearance for a pro-competitive merger, and to
20Notice that, in order to identify whether deals are perceived as anti-competitive, we
only use the sign of the expected change in the stock price. Hence, the fact that the market
may anticipate the outcome of the antitrust procedure or any other bias in the size of the
CAARs due to other market expectations, do not introduce a bias in our identification.
21We define the gains for the merging firms and rivals as the CAARs multiplied by their
market value, i.e. the firms’ cumulative aggregate absolute value change due to the merger.
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increase with the gains of the rivals, as they would like to block such mergers.
The interests of both kinds of firms are, instead, aligned in the case of anti-
competitive mergers. Hence, the probability of a type II error should increase
with the gains of the merging firms as well as with those of the rivals, if they
manage to lobby for their favorable decision.
Second, the size of the country from which the merging firms originate could
also play a role in the outcome of a merger investigation, presumably because
of the political pressure that can be exerted by large countries (e.g. Neven,
Nuttall, and Seabright (1993) and Horn and Levinsohn (2001)). Third, as
shown by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007), the European Commission might be
protectionist and favor European versus US firms, hence the country of origin
of the merging parties might be a determinant of the EC’s mistakes. Fourth,
the EC was often alleged to define relevant markets too narrowly, which might
imply a higher frequency of errors (Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright (1993)).
Fifth, procedural issues, such as the time available to undertake the merger
analysis, may be important. In particular whether the case has been decided
in phase 1 instead of being subject to a more substantial investigation (phase
2) might increase the likelihood of errors. Sixth, a full merger as compared to
a partial merger or a joint venture might be seen as more problematic since the
anti-competitive effects that it generates might be expected to be larger (e.g.
Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and Gugler and Siebert (2007)), whereas a cross-
border merger might be treated more leniently since the market power aspects
might be less problematic (e.g. Neary (2007)). Seventh, the pattern of errors
may vary across the sectors in which the mergers are taking place, as some
industrial sectors are more concentrated and/or have more political influence
than others. Finally, the EC may learn over time how to implement more
precise and effective remedial actions (Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011))
and, therefore, the proclivity of errors might be a function of the history of
merger control decisions and of time.
To assess how the institutional changes introduced together with the new
merger regulation affected the likelihood and determinants of the EC’s mis-
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takes, we run the basic regressions 3 and 4 separately on the pre- and post-
reform sub-samples.
Rent-Reversion
The next step is to assess the ability of different policy tools to effectively
reduce the market power effects of a merger and, at the same time, to maintain
the benefits to consumers generated by increased efficiency. The logic behind
the approach developed by Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011) is that there
should be a reversion of the (anti-competitive) rents measured around the
merger announcement due to the decision, if the antitrust action is effective.
This implies that decision CAARs should be systematically negatively related
to announcement CAARs when a decision is effective. We therefore assess
the effectiveness of an antitrust action by running the following regression
separately for merging firms and rivals:
ΠD∗fj =
∑
d
αfd +
∑
d
βfdΠ
A∗
fj + γfXj + fj (5)
where ΠD∗fj is the probability-corrected decision CAAR of merging firms
(f = M) and competitors (f = C), respectively, for merger j, while ΠA∗fj is
the probability-corrected announcement CAAR. We estimate different inter-
cepts (αs) and slopes (βs) for the different decisions (d=clearance, behavioral
remedies, structural remedies, or prohibition).22 In all specifications we con-
trol for time and industry effects (manufacturing and communications), as well
as some merger-specific characteristics (full and conglomerate mergers).
Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011) explain in depth the sizes and signs
of the intercepts and slopes, which are expected if merger control is perfectly
22We distinguish remedies in two broad categories: behavioral and structural. Behavioral
remedies contain all obligations concerning the conduct of the merged entity vis-à-vis its
competitors. These include access to key facilities, supply guarantees and the disentangle-
ment of intertwined directorates. Structural remedies mostly concern the divestiture of a
business branch or a production site. Past empirical research suggests the superiority of
structural remedies over behavioral ones - e.g. the in-house studies of the EU Commission
(European Commission (2005)) and the FTC (Baer (1999)).
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effective and under our maintained assumptions. The key points are, however,
summarized below.
Prohibitions. The most extreme action taken by the EC, i.e. to block the
merger, dissipates all rents, i.e. both the market power and the efficiency rents.
Therefore, the slope coefficient should be βprohib = −1 for merging firms and
rivals. Moreover, the regression line should pass through the origin: if the
merger does not generate any rents, no rents can be reverted by the decision,
thus αprohib = 0.
Clearances. If the merger is cleared without commitments, we do not expect
decision effects that are systematically related to announcement returns, thus
αclear = 0 and βclear = 0 for merging firms and rivals. This does not need
to be the case if the reaction around the decision date conveys good news to
the market about the feasibility of future mergers. In this case, we expect
positive constants and/or slopes for the rivals if the clearing of the merger
signals a green light from the EC to mergers in that particular industry. This
is even more likely if the EC makes type II errors and unconditionally clears
anti-competitive mergers.
Remedies. The situation is more complex in the case of remedies. Only
market power rents should be dissipated by the antitrust decision if it is effec-
tive. Hence, each remedial action should entail a negative decision effect for
merging firms and rivals. Hence, for rivals, we expect a negative intercept as
well as a negative slope. The former captures the shift due to the elimination of
the market power rents, while the latter indicates that rent-reversion should be
larger, the larger the size of the market power rents generated by the merger.
For the merging firms, instead, since both market power and efficiency effects
are positive, we only expect a negative slope, while we expect a zero intercept.
We run separate regressions for the pre- and post-reform periods to assess
the impact of the new merger regulation.23 The variables contained in the
vector Xj are again exogenous controls, such as year and industry dummies,
and other merger-specific characteristics.
23Only two cases were blocked post-ECMR 04, so we had to drop prohibitions from the
effectiveness regressions.
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Deterrence
Up to this point we have focused on the ex ante (predictability) and in-fieri ef-
fects (decision errors and rent-reversion) of merger policy. However, as pointed
out by Sørgard (2009) an optimal merger policy also entails ex-post effects since
it involves deterrence. In particular, he shows that there is an optimal level of
enforcement where some actions, which in isolation would be welfare detrimen-
tal, might be optimally taken to achieve deterrence and thus increase overall
welfare. Hence, the role of deterrence is especially important if competition
authorities commit errors and if their remedies are not always and completely
effective. If this was not the case and merger policy was perfectly effective,
then firms would know ex ante that every anti-competitive merger would be
blocked or effectively remedied by the antitrust authority and, therefore, they
would not even attempt to propose such combinations. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of type I errors, firms would always propose a pro-competitive merger
knowing that it would always be cleared and that over-deterrence would not
be an issue. Hence, the existence of decision mistakes is a key ingredient in a
deterrence model.
Very few studies have empirically analyzed deterrence in merger policy.
Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros (2009), by using a panel of antitrust ju-
risdictions over the period 1992-2003, find that prohibitions deter future merger
activity, as measured by the number of merger notifications, while remedies
do not. Hence, they exclusively focus on the frequency aspect but cannot say
whether merger policy over-deterred pro-competitive mergers. The question
of the composition of mergers which are deterred by the policy is analyzed in
a sequent paper (Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2010)). They analyze the US
merger policy in the period 1986-1999 and show that second-request investi-
gations and, even more so, antitrust interventions yield significant deterrence
effects for horizontal mergers, i.e. negatively affect the ratio between hori-
zontal to total notified mergers. They conclude that a tougher merger policy
makes firms move away from potentially problematic horizontal mergers to-
ward vertical mergers that are more likely to be efficiency-increasing. Yet, such
25
identification is quite simplistic since many horizontal mergers might involve
efficiency-enhancing synergies. Key to the analysis of deterrence in merger
control is that a good policy should deter firms from proposing socially detri-
mental mergers but it should not over-deter and hence discourage firms from
proposing efficiency-increasing combinations.
Our analysis takes an important step in the direction of analyzing this is-
sue and focuses on measuring ’good’ deterrence. This is enabled by the unique
information contained in our dataset that allows a much cleaner definition of
the competitive nature of each merger and a finer prediction on the quality
of deterrence achieved by the policy. For each merger we use the indicator of
its anti-competitive nature (Dj = 1 if ΠA∗Cj ≥ 0) and test for the deterrence
effects of merger policy by looking at how past decisions affects the probability
of a particular merger to be anti-competitive. In particular, we look at how
the complete merger policy history of the European Commission affected the
anti-competitiveness of the mergers in our sample. We thus combine measures
of DG Comp’s merger policy from the population of over 3,800 mergers scru-
tinized in the sample period with our dataset to estimate a probit equation of
the following type:
Djt = α0 + α1njt−2 +
∑
d
α2d
djt−2
njt−2
+ α3Xj + j (6)
whereDjt is equal to 1 if merger j proposed in quarter t was anti-competitive.
The variable njt−2 is equal to the total number of notifications to the EC two-
quarters before merger j was notified, and djt−2
njt−2
represents the ratio of the
total number of mergers with outcome d (where d = remedies, blockings, or
withdrawals) over the total number of notified mergers lagged by two-quarters.
Again, we control for other merger specific determinants Xj as we do in the
other regressions.
The lagged number of notifications controls for merger wave effects. While
several studies show that merger waves can be driven by periods of over- and
undervaluation of the stock market (e.g. Gugler, Mueller, and Weichselbaumer
(2011), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Harford (2005)), very few
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studies have looked at how merger waves might impact the competitive effects
of a merger (e.g. Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2005) and Clougherty and
Duso (2009)). One might argue that on the wave-crest the quality of the
targets and the fit of the match between acquirer and target is worse. Hence,
less efficiency-enhancing and potentially more anti-competitive mergers will be
proposed.
More importantly, the kind of merger policy decisions and their effective-
ness send signals to firms about the toughness of the authority. If merger
policy deters anti-competitive mergers, one should expect negative coefficients
for all kinds of actions. Yet, as shown by Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros
(2009), the kind of signal a particular decision sends to the firms and, hence,
the kind of merger the firms propose, crucially depends on the expectations the
firms have about the merger policy. It is quite clear that prohibitions have a
deterrence effect, as they represent the toughest action an antitrust authority
can take. Similarly, one could argue that when the merger parties withdraw or
abort a notified merger, this might be interpreted as an ’almost-prohibition’
(Bergman, Jakobsson, and Razo (2005)) and, therefore, this can be expected
to have similar deterrence effects. The deterrence effects of remedies are not
so clear cut and depend on whether they are effective and whether they come
at the expense of clearances or prohibitions. First, ineffective remedies cannot
strongly deter as they do not constitute a real threat for firms which want
to propose anti-competitive combinations. Second, if the antitrust authority
becomes tougher and imposes remedies on mergers which were expected to
be outrightly cleared, then the firms will see this as a negative signal and,
potentially, some anti-competitive mergers will not be proposed. If, instead,
the authority applies remedies on mergers which were expected to be blocked,
the firms may update their beliefs, deducing that merger control has become
more lenient and, therefore, propose more anti-competitive mergers. We will
use the difference between phase 1 and phase 2 remedies to shed some light on
these issues.
We estimate regression (6) separately for the pre- and post-reform periods
to identify the potential effect of the reform. Notice that, similarly to the
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rent-reversion regressions, we are not able to identify the effect of prohibitions
post-reform, since only two mergers were blocked after 2004.
Data
Data Sources
Our sample includes 326 merger cases scrutinized by the EC from the beginning
of 1990 to the end of 2007. We collected information on all phase 2 mergers
during the sample period, together with a randomly matched sample of phase
1 merger cases. The first half of the sample (157 mergers from 1990 to the
end of 2002) was first developed by Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), whereas
the 169 cases for the 2003-2007 period were newly collected and evaluated
for this paper.24 By carefully reading the text of publicly available merger
cases handled by DG Comp, we identified the merging parties, their rivals,
relevant markets, decision types, the dates of the notification, phase 1 and
possibly phase 2 decision, and some other merger-specific characteristics.25
From these decisions, we identified a total of 3,026 involved parties, 735 of
them are merging parties and 2,291 are competitors. Due to data limitations
and the requirement that firms have to be listed, the final sample contains
1,771 of these firms (522 merging parties and 1,249 competitors). Since there
are overlaps in the firms’ roles as merging parties and competitors, i.e. the
same firm appearing as a merging party and/or competitor in multiple cases,
our sample includes 1,104 unique firms.
Using the EC’s merger assessment to identify the rivals represents a par-
ticular strength of this sample. It has the big advantage of being a much more
realistic description of the relevant markets than, say, using SIC codes, which
would yield a sample of firms active in the same branch, but possibly not
24While, for the first part of the sample, phase 1 cases were taken completely randomly,
we over-sampled the phase 1 cases cleared with remedies in the 2003-2007 period. We did
this because we were particularly interested in analyzing the effects of actions in phase 1.
25All documents are publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/.
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competing in the specific product market concerned in a merger. This is par-
ticularly true for large, integrated corporations, which are active in numerous
sectors (e.g. Eckbo and Wier (1985)).
Following Banerjee and Eckard (1998), the announcement date of a merger
is defined as the date on which first rumors of that particular merger leaked
to the market. This is usually before the official notification to the EC as
well as the official merger announcement. We used the financial press and
the Dow Jones Interactive database to identify the dates at which the first
definitive indications of the combination between the merging parties became
known.26 The total return index, market value and branch index time series for
the identified parties were downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Datastream
database, providing daily data for the variables in question.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the dummy variables partitioning our dataset for the pe-
riods before and after the merger policy reform in our sample and in the
population.
In our sample, the percentage of cases that were cleared with remedies
increases from 42% in the pre-reform period to 60% post-reform. If compared
to the population data (7% pre-reform to 6% post-reform), remedied cases are
clearly over-sampled. This is due to two facts. First, we over-sampled phase
2 cases. Second, for the period 2002-2007, we also over-sampled remedied
cases in phase 1, which explains their increase from 14% to 40%, while in
the population data they are constant at a rate of 4%. Our sample, however,
mimics the population data for what concerns the use of remedies in phase 2.
They decrease from 28% to 14% from the pre- to the post-reform period in
26As a robustness check, we collected data on the merger’s official announcement date
from the SDC database (Thomson Reuters). Unfortunately, this database turned out to
be incomplete and we were able to identify only 240 of our original mergers. Most of the
official announcements are in an interval around five days before and two days after the first
rumors. For some 20% of the cases the first rumor was 15 days or earlier before the official
announcement.
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our sample and from 3% to 1% in the population. Prohibitions represent 6%
and 2% of the cases pre- and post-reform in the sample, and 0.8% and 0.06%
in the population. All other cases have been cleared without conditions and
obligations. For the population data, we also have information on aborted or
withdrawn cases. These represent 3% and 2% of the notified cases pre- and
post-reform, respectively.
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Figure 1: Evolution of cases and decisions in our sample
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We report the yearly average of notified cases as well as the ratio of different decisions
(remedies in phase 1 and phase 2, prohibitions) to the notified cases in our sample.
Figures 1 and 2 show the time evolution of notifications and actions in
the sample and in the population respectively. In both the sample and the
population, we observe an increasing trend in notifications with a single big
drop around 2002. The proportion of remedies in phase 2 oscillates before 1999
to then take a downward trend, while the proportion of remedies in phase 1
increases substantially. The prohibitions ratio displays a downward trend, with
only 2 prohibitions after the merger reform. Abortions or withdrawals stay at
a rate of 4% to 6% until 2002, then slightly decrease to increase again in 2005
and 2006.
Finally, for the mergers in our sample, we have more precise information
about the cases’ specificities (bottom part of table 1). From the pre- to the
post-reform period, we observe an increase in divestitures (from 29% to 45%),
a small decrease in behavioral remedies (from 26% to 25%), a tendency to
use a narrower market definition (more national and fewer EU-wide markets),
more conglomerate and full mergers, and less involvement of US firms.
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Figure 2: Evolution of cases and decisions in the population
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We report yearly average for the number of notified cases as well as the ratio of different
outcomes (remedies in phase 1 and phase 2, prohibitions, abortions) to the notifications
in the population of all EU merger cases.
Structure of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns
We calculate the CAARs over the event windows according to the methods
presented in Appendix A. We use the total return index from Datastream,
which accounts for dividends and corrects for stock splits. Table 2 reports
mean values for merging firms and rivals, in the pre- and post-reform periods
respectively.
On average, the mergers in the sample are profitable for merging firms
pre-reform and yield an increase in their stock value of around 1.6%, which
is significant at the 5% confidence level. After the reform, mergers are still
significantly profitable for merging firms yet the average CAAR drops to 1.1%.
The impact of DG Comp’s decisions on the valuation of merging firms is very
similar pre- and post- reform and entails a negative, but not significant, drop
in the firms’ stock value by 0.3% and 0.5% respectively.
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Table 2: CAARs of merging parties and rivals by period and event
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
N Mean S.E. N Mean S.E.
Merging Firms
Announcement 200 0.016∗∗ (0.009) 96 0.011∗ (0.008)
Decision 197 −0.003 (0.008) 96 −0.005 (0.005)
Rivals
Announcement 208 0.008 (0.007) 105 0.011∗ (0.007)
Decision 207 −0.003 (0.009) 105 −0.009 (0.007)
The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respec-
tively.
The competitors’ merger announcement effects are positive (0.8%) but not
significant prior to the reform, and they increase to 1.1% and become signif-
icant at the 10% significance level post-reform. Similar to the merging firms,
rivals suffer an average negative reaction around the EC decision, which ranges
between 0.3% pre-reform and 0.9% post-reform. In both cases, however, the
average CAARs are not statistically different from zero.
Empirical Results
Probability of Intervention
The first piece of evidence on the effects of the merger policy reform relates to
the predictability of antitrust intervention. The regression results of the probit
model (2) are displayed in table 3. We report the marginal effects of different
sets of observable factors that we expect to explain the intervention of the EC
on a specific case. Before looking at the coefficient estimates, we first focus on
the predictive power of the probit regressions pre- and post-reform. We then
discuss in brief the main determinants of an action and how they changed over
time.
The first observation is that the pseudo−R2 pre-reform (0.51) is more than
twice as large as post-reform (0.23). This implies that our model explains
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Table 3: Probit Model: Probability of Intervention
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved −0.425∗∗∗ (0.098) −0.424∗∗∗ (0.077)
EU firms involved −0.291∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.110∗ (0.065)
Big EU country 0.039 (0.107) −0.361∗∗ (0.176)
Conglomerate merger 0.455∗∗∗ (0.139) 0.400 (0.283)
Full merger 0.310∗∗∗ (0.114) −0.209∗∗ (0.088)
Crossborder merger 0.003 (0.110) 0.130 (0.115)
Log(MV) merging firms 0.043∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.012 (0.007)
Log(MV) rivals 0.034∗∗ (0.014) 0.033∗ (0.017)
Rival announcement CAAR −0.525 (0.390) 0.720 (0.714)
Phase 2 Case 0.780∗∗∗ (0.069) 0.049∗∗ (0.023)
Worldwide markets −0.186 (0.164) −0.063 (0.109)
National markets 0.435∗∗∗ (0.088) 0.581∗∗ (0.239)
Number of regions involved 0.053 (0.066) −0.110∗∗∗ (0.042)
Number of markets involved 0.103 (0.077) 0.032 (0.065)
Mining 0.287 (0.262) −0.371 (0.255)
Manufacturing 0.024 (0.169) −0.045 (0.248)
Transport 0.364∗∗∗ (0.111) −0.240 (0.278)
Communication 0.134 (0.135) −0.473∗∗∗ (0.157)
Finance −0.339∗∗ (0.150)
Service −0.208 (0.211) −0.398∗∗ (0.175)
Lagged notifications 0.001 (0.003) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.005)
Lagged actions ratio 1.601∗∗ (0.693) 5.453∗∗∗ (0.990)
Lagged abortions ratio 0.153 (1.838) −12.345∗∗∗ (1.104)
Time trend 0.002 (0.007) 0.042∗∗ (0.018)
Observations 203 105
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.23
CorrClassified 87% 71%
Sensitivity 86% 83%
Specificity 87% 54%
The dependent variable is action, defined as Pj = 1 when the merger is remedied or
blocked, and zero otherwise. Marginal effects are reported. dF/dx is for discrete change
of a dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and allow
for correlation among observations from the same year. The symbols ***, **, and * rep-
resent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The EU firms dummy
indicates that one of the merging parties is headquartered in the EU. Big EU countries
are Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, Crossborder mergers involve at least
two nations, Log(MV ) refers to the logged market values of merging parties and rivals.
For the Rival announcement CAAR see . The number of regions and markets variables
count the (geographic) regions and (product) markets concerned by a merger. Mining,
Manufacturing, Transport, Communication, Finance and Service are industry dum-
mies. For the lagged population variables, see . The time trend is measured in quarters.
The remaining dummies are defined at the bottom of table 1.
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the behavior of the EU Commission pre-reform much better than after the
reform. It appears that a merger control approach based more on a case-by-
case analysis and relying less on clear-cut rules reduces the predictive power
of the conventional ’external’, observable determinants. 27
Looking at the other measures of goodness of fit, our model is able to
correctly classify 87% of the observations pre-reform, whereas post-reform we
correctly classify 71% of the observations. We can also identify where this
difference comes from. There is very little difference pre-reform (86%) and
post-reform (83%) in the ability of our model to correctly classify interventions
(remedies and blockings) by the EU Commission measured by the sensitivity
statistic. Post reform, however, the model is much less able to correctly classify
the outright clearances, i.e. specificity. This happens in only 54% of the cases
post-reform versus 87% of the cases pre-reform. Therefore, it seems that the
reform reduced the predictability of an absence of an action by the EC based on
measurable characteristics, however the reform did not reduce legal certainty
in case of an intervention. As we shall see later, this is an indication of the
generally more active stance of the EC.
We then look at the observable factors, which are significant predictors
of the merger control outcome and identify some differences. A first set of
variables that we consider is related to the ’political economy environment’.
The country of origin of the firms involved in a merger case is an important
driver of the EC’s decision. In both periods, the probability of eliciting an
action is over 42% lower if a US firm is involved. Also, there is a shift toward
a significant reduction in the likelihood of an action if a big EU country was
involved in the case post-reform. This confirms the argument put forward
by Horn and Levinsohn (2001), who point to the effectiveness of the political
pressure by large countries.28 However, the likelihood of interventions increases
post-reform if EU firms are involved, thus we cannot confirm the findings of
Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) concerning protectionism.
27Of course, we cannot rule out that any policy shift would reduce predictability for a
certain time period, until the firms learn the rules and get acquainted to them.
28The big EU countries are: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK.
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Merger specific characteristics play a more significant role pre-reform, with
a significant increase in the probability of eliciting an action for full mergers,
and mergers between large firms and with large competitors. This corresponds
to the intuition that full mergers are potentially more harmful to competition
than mere share acquisitions or joint ventures. It also suggests that the EC
was more suspicious of concentrations among large firms pre-reform, which
can be seen as in accordance with the doctrine dictated by the dominance
test. Post-reform, instead, full mergers are 21% significantly less likely to be
remedied or blocked. While the size of the merging firms does not play a role
anymore, the size of the competitors still significantly increases the likelihood
of an action.
The anti-competitive nature of the merger should be the main driver of
the antitrust decision. We use two different proxies for this unobserved fac-
tor. Our first indicator is the size of the announcement CAARs of the rivals,
as the signals upon which the market bases its evaluation of a merger might
also be available to DG Comp during its assessment of the combination. Even
though the CAAR-coefficient assumes the expected positive sign after the re-
form, no statistically significant relationship emerges. Instead, the fact that
the merger went to phase 2, which is our second indicator of the competitive
issues raised by the merger, is a very significant predictor. Yet, sizeable effects
are only seen pre-reform (an increase of 78% in the likelihood of an action),
while post-reform the increase is by only 5%. This corroborates the fact that
in more recent years the EC increasingly started to use remedies also in the
early phase 1 investigation phase. The market definition is an important de-
terminant of an intervention. If the relevant market is defined nationally, the
likelihood of eliciting an action increases by over 43% pre-reform and 58%
post-reform: smaller product markets are more problematic.29 Consistently,
post-reform, if the involved firms (merging and rivals) originate from more
geographic world regions, the probability of intervention is significantly re-
29It could, however, also be that DG Comp sometimes defines the relevant anti-trust mar-
kets too narrowly and makes mistakes, see section 4.2. and (Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright
(1993)).
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duced. Industry effects are significant pre-reform (transport and finance) and
post-reform (communication).
Finally, we look at whether past decisions of the EC affect current deci-
sions to capture possible learning or path-dependency effects. If the EC was
very active in the last-but-one quarter, the probability of an action increases
significantly. This points to some kind of path-dependency in the EC’s deci-
sions. The limited resources’ argument seems to have bite post-reform, since
the likelihood of an intervention decreases significantly with an increase of no-
tifications in the last quarter. Post-reform, if there are more abortions in the
previous last-but-one quarter, the EC steps in less frequently. This might be an
indication that abortions or withdrawals have a deterrent effect post-reform,
an issue to which we return later. We also observe a positive and significant
time trend toward more interventions by the EC in the post-reform period.
As we explain in the appendix , we use the predicted values from these
probit regressions to estimate the probability of an action ρ̂, which is used to
build our measure of corrected CAARs that will be used in the following steps
of our analysis.
Type I and Type II Errors
The next piece of evidence on the effects of the merger control reform is the
analysis of the EU Commission’s possible mistakes in the enforcement of the
merger regulation. We first look at simple frequencies, which are reported in
table 4.
Table 4: Type I/II errors by period
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean S.D. Count Mean S.D. Count
Type I error 0.221 (0.416) 46 0.324 (0.470) 34
Type II error 0.269 (0.445) 56 0.181 (0.387) 19
Frequency of type I errors (action in a pro-competitive merger) and type II
errors (unconditional clearance of an anti-competitive merger) in the sample.
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Post-reform, we observe on average more type I errors (32% compared to
22%) and fewer type II errors (18% compared to 27%) than in the pre-reform
period. This hints to the fact that the EC has become, on average, more active
since the introduction of the new merger regulation: it intervenes more often
in pro-competitive mergers and there are fewer anti-competitive cases without
intervention. While we are fully aware that a welfare analysis of this policy
shift is not possible in our context, we want to stress that we measure weak
type I errors. Arguably, the cost generated by the application of a remedy on
a merger which is pro-competitive on average is possibly smaller than the cost
of letting anti-competitive mergers through completely unchallenged.
To analyze the determinants of type I errors (i.e. the EC intervenes in
pro-competitive mergers), we use the variables discussed in the section on the
theory of decision errors.30 The results of regression (3) are reported in table
5.
First, we look at measures of governmental pressure. If one of the merging
parties is a US-based firm, the likelihood of wrongly eliciting an action in pro-
competitive mergers is, ceteris paribus, 76% lower in the pre-reform period
and 57% lower after the reform. This reflects the results discussed above
when we presented the determinants of an action. Apparently, thus, the EC is
particularly cautious to avoid making type I errors when US firms are involved
and this pattern does not change after the reform. We do not find any evidence
of lobbying by firms, as expressed by the gains they obtain through the mergers,
both before and after the reform.
Pro-competitive, full mergers are more likely to be wrongly remedied before
the reform but less so after the reform. Before the reform, a type I error
is significantly more likely when the merging firms and the competitors are
large, while after the reform the size of competitors is not significant anymore.
This might indicate that market shares matter less while economic reasoning
matters more in post-reform EC decisions. Post-reform, cross-border mergers
are more likely to be wrongly remedied, however. The market definition is
30Notice that, for the post-reform period, we were forced to drop some variables because
of collinearity problems due to the small sample size.
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Table 5: Probit Model: Probability of Type I errors
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved −0.761∗∗∗ (0.142) −0.565∗∗∗ (0.188)
EU firms involved −0.822∗∗∗ (0.148) 0.804∗∗∗ (0.147)
Big EU country 0.384∗∗ (0.152) −0.934∗∗∗ (0.093)
Profit change - merging firms −0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.002)
Profit change - rivals 0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000)
Conglomerate merger 0.114 (0.409)
Full merger 0.573∗∗∗ (0.190) −0.720∗∗∗ (0.222)
Crossborder merger 0.112 (0.227) 0.805∗∗∗ (0.172)
Log(MV) merging firms 0.065∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.172∗∗∗ (0.052)
Log(MV) rivals 0.072∗∗ (0.028) −0.074 (0.046)
Worldwide markets −0.646∗∗∗ (0.111) −0.883∗∗∗ (0.071)
EU-wide markets −0.722∗∗∗ (0.125) −0.863∗∗∗ (0.132)
Number of regions involved 0.102 (0.138) −0.323∗∗∗ (0.073)
Number of markets involved −0.006 (0.239) 0.366 (0.256)
Phase 2 case 0.971∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.423∗ (0.245)
Manufacturing −0.635∗ (0.350) −0.619∗∗ (0.265)
Communication −0.460∗∗∗ (0.123) −0.786∗∗∗ (0.170)
Service −0.467∗∗∗ (0.105) −0.414∗ (0.245)
Electricity −0.431∗∗∗ (0.108)
Finance −0.563∗∗∗ (0.097)
Transport −0.223 (0.415)
Lagged notifications −0.003 (0.009) −0.039∗∗∗ (0.014)
Lagged actions ratio 5.088 (4.144) −0.880 (7.028)
Lagged abortions ratio 0.527 (2.714) −39.688 (39.004)
Time trend 0.012 (0.018) 0.096 (0.071)
Observations 88 49
Pseudo R2 0.70 0.46
CorrClassified 93% 82%
Sensitivity 93% 93%
Specificity 93% 67%
The dependent variable is type I error defined as E1j = 1 if Pj = 1 and Dj = 0, and zero
otherwise (action in a pro-competitive merger). Marginal effects are reported. dF/dx is for
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses are robust
and allow for correlation among observations form the same year. The symbols ***, **, and
* represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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again very important. The EC tends to commit significantly more type I errors
if the market is narrowly defined (nationally), and the likelihood of a mistake
significantly decreases if the market is defined to be EU-wide or world-wide.
This pattern is reinforced post-reform. Again, this is evidence that DG Comp
sometimes defines the relevant anti-trust markets too narrowly (e.g. Neven,
Nuttall, and Seabright (1993)). Additionally, post-reform, the fact that the
merger affects several geographic regions reduces type I errors. Both before
and after the introduction of the new merger regulation, we find significant
industry effects. Only after the reform, the EC’s past decisions appear to
affect the proclivity of type I errors. The likelihood decreases if the number
of notifications increases: A large work-load might prevent the EC from being
too pro-active in general and, in particular, against pro-competitive cases. The
model’s predictive power is very high both in terms of pseudo−R2 and in terms
of correct predications. Low values for the specificity statistic mostly explain
why post-reform the percentage of correctly classified cases decreases from 93%
to 82%.
We then move to the estimation of equation (4): the determinants of type
II errors (i.e. the EC unconditionally clears anti-competitive mergers). The
marginal effects of the probit estimations are reported in table 6.
We estimate significantly more type II errors in mergers involving US firms
and merging parties coming from the big EU countries, but only post-merger
reform. This hints at some form of political pressure by national governments.
Moreover, we observe that the larger the gains for the merging firms, the lower
the likelihood of eliciting an action in an anti-competitive merger, which is
consistent with successful lobbying by merging parties. On the contrary, the
coefficient for the rivals is negative and significant in the post-reform period.
This goes against the idea that the rivals were also successful in lobbying the
EC to let an anti-competitive merger be cleared. The negative sign might
be interpreted as revealing that the EC is increasingly careful not to commit
type II errors when the merger becomes more anti-competitive, i.e. the larger
the profit gains for the rivals. This might also indicate that the EC takes
stock market reactions increasingly into account in its decisions (see also Monti
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Table 6: Probit Model: Probability of Type II errors
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved 0.149 (0.093) 0.899∗∗∗ (0.090)
EU firms involved −0.162 (0.113) −0.282∗∗ (0.135)
Big EU country 0.154∗ (0.087) 0.711∗∗∗ (0.216)
Profit change - merging firms 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.005∗∗ (0.002)
Profit change - rivals −0.000 (0.000) −0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Conglomerate merger −0.236∗∗∗ (0.089) −1.000∗∗∗ (0.001)
Full merger −0.306∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.389∗ (0.202)
Crossborder merger 0.062 (0.112) 0.246∗∗∗ (0.063)
Log(MV) merging firms −0.029∗ (0.015) 0.248∗∗ (0.098)
Log(MV) rivals −0.025∗ (0.014) 0.031 (0.031)
EU-wide markets −0.223∗ (0.135) −0.271 (0.234)
National markets −0.250∗ (0.133) −1.000∗∗∗ (0.001)
Number of regions involved −0.007 (0.049) 0.119∗∗ (0.052)
Number of markets involved −0.036 (0.082) 0.276∗ (0.154)
Phase 2 case −0.469∗∗∗ (0.141) 0.921∗∗∗ (0.097)
Manufacturing 0.212 (0.170) −0.122 (0.315)
Communication 0.009 (0.187)
Service 0.426 (0.599) 0.847∗∗∗ (0.099)
Electricity −0.050 (0.126)
Trade 0.094 (0.213)
Transport −0.105∗ (0.056) 0.534 (0.444)
Lagged notifications −0.002 (0.001) −0.006 (0.006)
Lagged actions ratio −0.153 (0.514)
Lagged abortions ratio 0.073 (1.122)
Time trend 0.008∗∗∗ (0.003)
Observations 100 42
Pseudo R2 0.55 0.54
CorrClassified 87% 90%
Sensitivity 91% 88%
Specificity 83% 92%
The dependent variable is type II error defined as E2j = 1 if Pj = 0 and Dj = 1, and
zero otherwise (unconditional clearance of an anti-competitive merger). Marginal effects are
reported. dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust and allow for correlation among observations form the same year.
The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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(2008)). Post-reform, the EC seems to be too lenient toward full mergers,
cross-border mergers, mergers involving large parties, and mergers concerning
many world regions and product markets. The likelihood of type II errors
increase in phase 2 post-reform, while pre-reform it decreases if the merger
entered the in-depth investigation phase. This indicates that the EC became
too hesitant to block or remedy mergers post-reform in phase 2. Again the
predictions of the model are quite accurate with a pseudo − R2 of over 50%
and the percentage of correct predictions are close to 90% in both periods.
Post-reform, specificity increased (from 83% to 92%) indicating that correct
decisions (remedy or blocking) in anti-competitive mergers became increasingly
more accurately predictable.
To conclude, our analysis so far shows that DG Comp became more pro-
active and therefore the composition of the mistakes changed toward more
(weak) type I and fewer type II errors, particularly in phase 2. Post-reform, we
find some evidence of successful political pressure by large EU countries and
the US and lobbying by merging parties to get potentially anti-competitive
mergers cleared. Post reform, the Commission became better at identifying
anti-competitive mergers arguably due to the application of the more eco-
nomics based approach.
Rent-Reversion Estimations
We now turn to the assessment of the effectiveness of different merger policy
tools to reduce the anti-competitive rents generated by the merger. We es-
timate equation (5) for the merging parties and their rivals separately. The
dependent variable, the probability-corrected decision CAAR, is regressed on
different constants for the different decisions (clearance, behavioral and
structural remedies, and prohibition), and on the interaction terms of deci-
sion type and probability-corrected announcement CAARs. These coefficients
measure the rent-reversion achieved by the respective decisions of DG Comp.
The regression results reported in table 7 for the pre-reform period are very
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close to those obtained by Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011) for the years
1990-2002.
We estimate a negative and significant slope of -0.92 for outright blockings
for merging firms, which is also negative but not significant for rivals (-0.53).
Both coefficients are not statistically significantly different from minus one.
Hence, prohibitions seem to fully reverse the rents measured by the stock
market around the announcement of the merger, and can be interpreted as
being an effective merger policy tool.
Clearances have a positive and significant effect on merging firms as mea-
sured by the intercept, yet, only in the pre-reform period. This suggests that
outright clearances send a positive, unexpected signal to the market. For rivals,
the positive and significant slope estimates, both pre- and post-reform, imply
that after an outright clearance their profitability increase with the size of their
announcement rents, which we interpret as a measure of anti-competitiveness.
Hence, our interpretation is that these findings are consistent with the market
evaluating the cost of a type II error: the more anti-competitive the deal is
(i.e. the larger the rivals’ rents at announcement), the more rivals profit from
an outright clearance. The coefficient estimates for remedies are also not in
line with the predictions for an effective merger control. In particular, the pre-
dicted negative shift for rivals is not observed pre-reform, since the estimated
intercepts are not significantly different from zero. For merging firms, we find
divestitures to even produce a positive and significant shift.
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To sum up, the main results pre-reform are: 1) prohibitions achieve full
rent-reversion; 2) remedies do not achieve full rent-reversion on average; 3)
outright clearances increase rents for merging firms and rivals, and the larger
the merger effect at announcement the more they do so. Our interpretation
of these findings in terms of merger policy effectiveness is: 1) prohibitions are
an effective merger control tool; 2) remedies are not perfectly effective; and 3)
some outright clearances might indeed be type II errors of the EC.
Looking at the post-reform sample, we only get two significant coefficients,
the intercept for behavioral remedies and the clearance slope for rivals. No-
tice, however, that we cannot estimate the degree of rent-reversion achieved
by prohibitions, since only two mergers were blocked post-reform. The neg-
ative intercept estimates in the case of remedies for rivals are indicative that
remedies achieve, on average, some degree of rent-reversion post-reform. Yet,
this reversion is not connected to the size of the announcement gains, since all
slope estimates in the case of remedies are not significantly different from zero.
The positive clearance slope for rivals again indicates that the market prices
some of the Commission’s type II errors.
The comparison of the scenarios before and after the reform suggest that,
indeed, post-reform remedies have on average become more effective in revert-
ing rents. However, we do not observe full rent-reversion, and outright clear-
ances remain good news for rivals, which we interpret as being their benefit
from type II errors. Given our result that prohibitions restore the pre-merger
situation in the pre-reform sample and, hence, our interpretation that such
policy instruments are effective, the reluctance of DG Comp to block mergers
which was reinforced post-reform does not seem to be well-placed.
Deterrence Estimations
The last piece of evidence we propose relates to the deterrence properties of EU
merger control. As mentioned in section , the deterrence properties of merger
control are particularly relevant if type I and type II errors occur or remedies
imposed by the antitrust authority are not always effective in reverting the anti-
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competitive rents generated by the merger. This is exactly the situation that
emerges from our results so far. To estimate the degree of ’good’ deterrence
achieved by the policy, we estimate model (6) and assess the likelihood that a
newly notified merger is anti-competitive as a function of the history of past
merger control decisions. The marginal effects of the probit estimations are
reported in table 8.
Table 8: Deterrence Regressions
Pre-reform Post-reform
Lagged notifications −0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.002)
Lagged remedies ratio - ph1 −1.062∗ (0.587) −2.721 (3.143)
Lagged remedies ratio - ph2 2.909∗∗ (1.259) −0.554 (6.989)
Lagged abortions ratio - ph1 0.581 (1.401) −9.673∗∗ (4.464)
Lagged abortions ratio - ph2 6.756∗∗ (3.350) −14.072∗∗ (7.009)
Lagged prohibitions ratio −7.099∗ (4.287)
Observations 200 105
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.10
CorrClassified 63% 63%
Sensitivity 68% 61%
Specificity 58% 64%
The dependent variable isDj = 1 if ΠA∗Cj ≥ 0, zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust and allow for correlation among observations from the same year. Marginal effects
are reported. We control for industry effects (manufacturing, mining, services), merger-
specific effects (full, cross-border and conglomerate mergers, relevant markets), firm-specific
effects (country of origin, size) and a time trend. The symbols ***, **, and * represent
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
We estimate negative and significant coefficients for the intensity of reme-
dies in phase 1 and for prohibitions in the pre-reform period. When the EC
increases the use of these kinds of policy tools in the three to six months pre-
vious to a newly notified merger, its likelihood of being anti-competitive is
significantly lower: these actions deter anti-competitive mergers. Prohibitions
deter because they are the toughest policy tools. Remedies in phase 1 deter be-
cause they often come at the expense of expected clearances (e.g. Seldeslachts,
Clougherty, and Barros (2009)) and because they are more clear cut and easy
to implement and, hence, more effective than phase 2 remedies (e.g. Duso, Gu-
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gler, and Yurtoglu (2011) and European Commission (2005)). Remedies and
abortions in phase 2, on the contrary, do not deter anti-competitive mergers.
They even increase the probability of anti-competitive mergers, possibly be-
cause they come at the expenses of a tougher action (prohibition) and therefore
signal a soft antitrust stance by the EC.
Once again, we cannot test for the effects of prohibitions post-reform, as
only two mergers were blocked after 2004. However, post reform, the ratios
of withdrawn or aborted mergers in phase 1 and phase 2 have a negative
and significant effect on the likelihood of a newly notified merger being anti-
competitive. Moreover, both the remedy ratios in phase 1 and in phase 2
have a negative, though not significant, effect on the probability of a merger
to be anti-competitive. After the reform, there was a clear policy shift to-
ward a different use of merger tools. Prohibitions became a very rare event,
and withdrawals or abortions appear to at least partially take over their de-
terrent role. One possible interpretation of these findings is that firms were
pushed by the EC to withdraw particularly problematic mergers by setting the
anti-competitive concerns at such a high level that any kind of remedy would
have become too costly. Hence, these withdrawals/abortions might have been
effective prohibitions.31
Robustness Checks
Purely Horizontal Mergers
As discussed in section , the correspondence between the change in consumer
surplus and competitors profits does not necessarily hold for non-horizontal
mergers. In all regressions we used a dummy to control for this issue, which is
set equal to 1 for all those cases in which the Commission mentioned conglom-
erate, vertical, or foreclosure effects as one of its leading arguments in support
of the final decision. In this section we discuss the results that we obtain by
31As noticed by Papanikolaou and Rosenthal (2011) "if the parties and the Commission
are unable to agree on remedies, a fairly common result is the withdrawal of the notification
to avoid the publication of a negative decision."
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dropping all these 118 cases from our sample, which leaves us with 162 mergers
pre-reform and 46 post-reform.32
The results for the merger policy’s predictability are only minimally affected
in terms of sign and significance.33 We observe some small changes in the size
of the estimated marginal effect. Post-reform, the fit of the model is slightly
increased even though some variables must be dropped because of collinearity
due to the extremely small sample size (46 observations). The percentage
of type I errors is higher than in the full sample (22% pre-reform and 43%
post-reform) and a similar pattern is observed for the type II errors (33%
pre-reform and 13.6% post-reform). Hence, the tendencies of a reduction of
type II errors at the expense of an increased number of type I errors that we
observed in the full sample are reinforced when considering purely horizontal
mergers. The determinants of both types of errors are very comparable in
terms of sign, significance, and size of the marginal effect pre-reform. While
the market definition variables becomes not significant in the type II regression,
in both type I and type II regressions the effect for the US becomes even larger
and more significant. Due to the limited sample size, it is unfortunately not
possible to estimate the determinants of the errors post-reform.34
Also the rent-reversion regressions reflect the main findings observed in
the full sample. The full rent-reversion achieved by the blocking decisions
pre-reform is, as expected, even reinforced in the sub-sample of horizontal
mergers – the coefficients are now -0.66 for the merging parties and -1.32 for
the rivals which, in both cases, are not significantly different from -1. The
32As an alternative definition for horizontal mergers, we also use a dummy that takes on
the value of 1 if both merging parties share their primary SIC-classification codes. The two
definitions overlap in 60% of the cases. According to this second definition, we drop 118
observations (54 pre-reform and 64 post-reform).
33Due to lack of space, we do not report all tables. The extensive results can, however,
be obtained from the authors upon request.
34Using the second definition for horizontal mergers, the results pre-reform are very similar
to those obtained for the full sample. The results for the post-reform regressions are in line
with the main specifications, yet several coefficients are less precisely estimated and thus
less significant due to the small sample size.
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sign and size of the other coefficients are comparable to those from the main
specification, hence the results are not qualitatively affected. Also in this
case, the same qualitative results are attained using the second definition of
horizontal mergers.
Concerning the deterrence regressions, the pre-reform results from the full
sample are almost perfectly matched for purely horizontal mergers. Post-
reform, some of the coefficients estimates become not significant due to the
small sample size, even though the sign and size of the coefficients are not
affected. Overall, we can therefore conclude that focusing on purely horizontal
mergers does not alter our qualitative results, even though the smaller sam-
ple size in some cases affects the precision of the estimation and hence the
significance level, especially post-reform.
The Timing of the Reform
To identify the effect of the reform, we choose the official date in which it legally
came into force as a marking point for the pre- and post-reform periods. This
choice of timing has a clear justification, since the EC could not have used the
legal framework provided by ECMR 04 before this date. However, there might
be reason to think that the right timing to assess the change in policy could
have been before or after this date. On the one hand, it could have been before,
because some of the reform’s elements were implemented during the months
antecedent the legal introduction of the new merger regulation and could have
affected the Commission’s policy enforcement.35 On the other hand, the right
timing to start the reform’s assessment could also have been after May 2004,
since it might have taken time before some of the innovations brought by the
reform had a clear policy impact. Hence, we propose two robustness checks
for this issue. First, we date the starting of the post-reform period back to the
beginning of 2003. Second, we eliminate the entire year 2004 from the sample.
35Lyons (2004), for instance, notices that several changes in merger control were being
implemented around 2003, such as the introduction of devil’s advocate panels, the proposal
of a clarification of the dominance test, the appointment of the first chief economist, the
publishing of the draft merger guidelines and the extension for timetable for remedies.
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In both cases, the results on the predictability of the policy pre-reform
do not change meterially. The frequency of type I and type II errors is also
not strongly affected by the selection of a different date or sample for the
introduction of the reform. The determinants regressions for type I errors
show similar coefficients estimates to the main specification, some of which are
however less significant (EU firms’s involvement, regions and markets involved,
industry dummies). A similar pattern results from the type II regressions
in both robustness checks. However, the post-reform results are much more
consistent with our main specification when we exclude the entire year 2004.
Again, this suggests that the change in the Commission’s behavior around the
time of the legal introduction of the reform in 2004 is particularly important
in the analysis of the determinants of the Commission’s errors.
The rent-reversion regressions are not strongly affected by the change in
the timing of the introduction of the ECMR 04 if not for a drop in significance
in the post-reform regressions in both robustness checks, where no coefficient
estimates are significant. Finally, choosing the beginning of 2003 as the intro-
duction year does not change any of the signs of the coefficients estimates both
pre- and post-reform in the deterrence regression. Yet, it leads to a drop in sig-
nificance, especially for prohibitions pre-reform and withdrawals post-reform.
However, when we exclude the entire year 2004, all the findings obtained in
our main regressions are perfectly mirrored in the robustness checks and sig-
nificance is restored.
All in all then, it seems that our qualitative results also hold if we adopt
another date for the formal introduction of the merger policy reform. How-
ever, results are much more significant, clear cut and in line with our main
specification when we exclude the year 2004. This suggests that the change in
policy around the date of the legal introduction of ECMR 04 was substantial
and supports our choice as the most precise way to identify the effects of the
reform.
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Conclusion
In our attempt to assess the economic impact of the change in legislation due
to the 2004 merger policy reform in Europe, we brought forward four pieces of
evidence: (1) estimations of the determinants of intervention, (2) estimations of
the frequency and determinants of type I and type II errors, (3) estimations of
rent-reversion by merger decisions, and (4) estimations of the deterrence effect
of merger decisions. These elements are thought to provide a comprehensive
evaluation of the entire process of merger control: from an ex ante perspective
on the predictability of the policy, to an in-fieri analysis of the effects of
particular merger tools, to finish with the ex-post view of the effects of current
policy enforcement on future firms’ behavior. The identification of the reform’s
effects is achieved by comparing the performance of merger control along these
four dimensions in the pre-reform and post-reform periods.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find mixed evi-
dence concerning the predictability of DG Comp’s decisions. On the one hand,
the reform did not decrease legal certainty in problematic mergers (i.e. anti-
competitive mergers). On the other hand, it has become significantly more
difficult to predict if the EC will unconditionally clear a merger. This might
be partially be due to the fact that it might take some time for firms to get
acquitted with a new policy. Second, there is a tendency toward more interven-
tions, especially a larger use of remedies, post-reform, resulting in fewer type
II errors at the expense of more (weak) type I errors. The new approach of the
EC, which is more clearly anchored on economic principles, appears to allow a
better identification of the problematic cases. According to our estimate, one
reason for more type I errors might be that markets are sometimes defined
too narrowly. In phase 2, however, it appears that the EC has become too
lenient, since type II errors increase during this investigation phase compared
to pre-reform. The existence of political and firm lobbying might be a possible
explanation. Third, according to our rent-reversion regressions, remedies are
not effective before and only very loosely effective after the reform. Some out-
right clearances are seen by the market as good news for the rivals, possibly
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indicating the cost of type II errors by the EC. Only prohibitions achieve full
rent-reversion, however, we can estimate their effect only pre-reform since only
two mergers were blocked post-reform. Given the undisputed effectiveness of
this merger policy tool compared to remedies, it appears that the EC blocks
too few mergers. Finally, we measure significant deterrence effects pre- and
post-reform. Pre-reform, these are achieved mostly via phase 1 remedies and
prohibitions which is in line with these being the most effective merger control
tools. Post-reform it appears that withdrawals/abortions substitute for the
role of prohibitions. Our robustness checks support two of our main identifica-
tion assumptions: to identify anti-competitive mergers via the rivals’ change
in profits seems to be a good approximation as confirmed by the regressions
from the sample of purely horizontal mergers, where this identification strat-
egy is more likely to hold. Moreover, to identify the introduction of the reform
with the date of its legal implementation in May 2004 seems to be key for
understanding the change in policy brought about by the reform.
In conclusion, the introduction of the ECMR 04 seems to have changed
European merger policy. Yet, in terms of effectiveness along our four dimen-
sions we paint a mixed picture. While, on the one hand, decisions are based
on a more economic analysis and we observe fewer type II errors than before,
we also find that the increased focus on remedies was only partially successful
and cannot replace the policy tool of straight prohibitions, which solve both
the competitive concerns raised by the concentration and deter future anti-
competitive mergers. Clearly, this policy shift was not only the product of the
reform, foremost, it might be the persistent reaction to the substantial shock
and political climate which originated from the Court of First Instance’s re-
verses of three prominent cases in the early 2000s. Yet, an approach to merger
control that is more clearly based on economic principles does not necessarily
mean abandoning the use of prohibitions, as shown by US antitrust authorities
that are far less hesitant to block mergers than their European counterpart.
The belief that remedies are a more sophisticated and cleaner instrument to
almost surgically appraise merger cases seems misplaced. Thus, according to
our analysis, while some of the changes brought about by the reform seem to
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go in the right direction, the positive impact on the efficiency of European
merger control is dampened especially by the fact that DG Comp deprives
itself of its most powerful tool: prohibitions.
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Appendix
Quantifying the Effect of a Merger and Merger
Decision
The estimation of the impact of a merger and merger decision proceeds in
several steps. First, we estimate a market model for each firm, which allows
us to simulate the counterfactual scenario of what would have happened if
the merger had not occured. Using this information, we then calculate the
cumulative abnormal rents generated by the merger or merger decision over
an event window spanning several days around the relevant dates. We then
aggregate the cumulative abnormal returns for the merging firms and their
rivals, to obtain a merger-specific information. Finally, we assume that market
participants can - to a certain degree - foresee the merger decisions, which is
priced in the stock of firms around the relevant event. Hence, to obtain a more
precise measure of the competitive effect of the merger and merger decision,
we correct for these market expectations.
The Market Model
Define Ri,j as the return of firm i at date j and Rmarketi,j as the market
return index of the branch of firm i. The market model predicts that the
daily return of a commodity i is proportional to the market index at any
given point in time t. Formally: Ri,t = α + βRmarket,t + εi,t.36 We can then
calibrate the coefficients of this model for all firms i = 1, . . . , N over a time
period of 240 trading days, namely the period from 290 to 50 days prior to
the announcement of the merger.37 Letting the estimation window end 50
36For the superiority of a market model over a constant mean return model in capturing
abnormal returns see MacKinlay (1997) or Schwert (1981).
37For some cases the market model could not be reliably estimated in this period due to
data limitations. In these cases the estimations window was shifted to 530 - 290 days prior
to announcement.
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days before the announcement (that is, the date on which the financial press
wrote about the proposed transaction) should yield unbiased estimates of the
market model’s coefficients and, hence, the ’normal’ firms’ return, which is our
counterfactual and that is given by: R̂i,t = α̂ + β̂Rmarket,t.
The Event Windows
The event windows are the time intervals around the dates of the relevant
events (e.g. merger or merger decision), during which new information hits
the market. In the absence of any information leakages, these windows can be
reduced to the event day. The larger the expectations that some information
was leaked to the market prior to the event, the larger the window should be.
Hence, the length of these windows is critical to the event study’s ability to
capture the profitability effects: if the window is too small, the effect might
not be wholly captured, whereas too large a window could dilute the result.38
To account for the structurally different circumstances of the various events
we consider, we use both a long as well as a short window. The long window is
the interval [t− 50, t+ 5] (where t designates the date of the event), the short
window is [t− 5, t+ 5].
For the announcement and the phase 2 decision, we employ the long win-
dow. In both cases information leakages could occur substantially earlier than
the date of the event in question. Rumors of mergers often circulate for weeks
before definitive signs reach the financial press. The same holds for an in-depth
merger investigation in phase 2, during which the Commission often contacts
competitors and customers of the merging firms during its assessment and in-
formation is likely to leak to the market.39 These prolonged processes could
easily reduce uncertainty and allow the concerned parties to adjust their an-
ticipations.
38Issues concerning the length of event windows and their ability to capture the effect of
regulation are more thoroughly discussed in Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010).
39The EC has a time-frame of 90 working days between phase 1 and phase 2 decisions.
62
The phase 1 investigation, on the other hand, lasts only 25 working days
and is conducted internally by DG Comp. Furthermore, a substantial part of
this relatively short time is utilized for the appraisal of administrative issues.
We therefore assume that information leakages to the market occur no earlier
than 5 days before the decision and that the stock prices adjust in a short
window around the decision. The event windows are schematically depicted in
figure 3.
Figure 3: Timeline of the events
ann - 50         ann         ph1          ph2
[ann - 290, ann - 50]
Market model estimation
[ann - 50, ann + 5]
CAAR ann
[ph1 - 5, ph1 + 5]
CAAR ph1
[ph2 - 50, ph2 + 5]
CAAR ph2
Aggregating the Abnormal Returns
The abnormal return of firm i at date j is defined as
ARi,j = Ri,j − Rˆi,j.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are then obtained by summing up
the abnormal returns over the event window (t1, t2):
CARi(t1, t2) =
t2∑
t=t1
ARi,t.
These CARs measure the profitability impact of a combination at the firm-
level. Measuring firm-level effects has the advantage of allowing for asymmetric
externalities of a merger.40 While we allow for asymmetric externalities at the
40It is an empirically well-documented phenomenon that merger targets usually experience
stock market gains, whereas buyers often lose. Likewise, the externalities on rivals need not
be evenly distributed as the degree of competition among firms might vary.
63
firm-level, the definition of an anti-competitive merger has to be done at the
aggregate level, since what matters for the policy is the impact of the merger
on the overall consumer surplus. Hence, to obtain a measure of the total
impact of a merger, we aggregate the merging firms’ as well as rivals’ CARs at
the merger level by using the relative market value of each firm as a weight.41
The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) at event e (announcement,
decision) for firms f (f = M for merging firms and C for their competitors)
in merger j are then given by
CAARefj =
Nfj∑
i=1
CARei mvi
Nfj∑
i=1
mvi
e = ann, dec f = M,C j = 1, . . . , 326
(7)
where Nfj denotes the number of merging firm or rivals for merger j and
mvi is the market value of firm i. The CAARs, as an aggregate measure of
the implications of a merger, are used to classify pro- and anti-competitive
mergers and serve in the probability of intervention estimation.
Correcting for Expectations
We assume that market participants can to a certain degree anticipate the de-
cisions of DG Comp, but that there is no perfect foresight: If the market could
perfectly foresee the actions of the EC, there would be no significant stock
reactions around the decision dates. The fact that there are significant devi-
ations from the market trend when news of a decision reaches the concerned
market participants can be interpreted as evidence in favor of our assump-
tion. Furthermore, the existence of prohibitions contradicts perfect foresight:
if managers could perfectly foresee the actions of DG Comp, mergers that end
up being blocked would not have been attempted in the first place, nor would
there have been significant reactions in response to their announcements.
41The idea of a ’firm portfolio’ weighted by market values is owed to Schwert (1981).
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Using the past merger control history and the knowledge of the structural
characteristics of a proposed merger, firms can form a prior of how likely it
is that DG Comp will intervene. This means that the observed abnormal
returns around the event dates do not measure the full effect but are the
expectation-adjusted abnormal returns, which take into account that the com-
bination might not go through or be subjected to remedies. Since we assume
that the market’s assessment reveals the competitive nature of a combination,
we would like to remove this adjustment of expectations to obtain the market
assessment in absence of merger control.
If expectations are rational, the expected value of the EC’s decision is:42
E[Πdec] = ρΠaction + (1− ρ)Πclear (8)
where Πaction(Πclear) denotes the merger’s profitability in case of an action
(a clearance) and ρ is the probability of an action. The observed abnormal
returns around the announcement (Πann) therefore are equal to the real effect
(Πann∗) plus the expected value of the EC’s final decision (E[Πdec]). Assuming
that an intervention by DG Comp destroys the anti-competitive rents gener-
ated by a combination (Πaction = −Πann∗) in their full extent (Πdec∗ = Πann∗),43
and that a clearance has no further effect on the market (Πclear = 0), the im-
pact of a merger can be written as:
Πann = Πann∗ + E[Πdec] = Πann∗ + ρ Πaction︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Πann∗
+(1− ρ) Πclear︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
⇔ Πann∗ = Π
ann
1− ρ
(9)
Similarly, the effect that we measure around the decision (Πdec) is an update
of the market’s beliefs concerning that particular decision and, hence, the
42Note that, to ease notation, we eliminate the subscript for the firms’ types (f = M for
merging firms and f = C for competitors) and the merger j.
43We realize that this assumption might be questioned, but it is necessary for probability
correction and seems less arbitrary than ex ante assuming a certain nonzero degree of rent
reversal.
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difference between the merger’s competitive effect and the market expectations
of the commission decision’s effect.44
Πdec = Πdec∗ + E[Πdec] = Πdec∗ + ρΠaction + (1− ρ)Πclear ⇔ Πdec∗ = Π
dec
1− ρ
If a case goes into phase 2, the market will again update its beliefs about
remedies.45 The effect around the phase 1 decision accounts for the adjustment
of market expectations to the new state of beliefs, the sum of both decision
effects captures the total impact of the EC’s decision. The real effect of the
decision is then given by
Πdec∗ =
ΠP1 + ΠP2
1− ρ
where ΠP1 (ΠP2) is the measured effect around the phase 1 (phase 2) decision
date.
Combining the equations for the decisions yields
Πdec∗ =
Π
dec
1−ρ if phase 1 case
ΠP1+ΠP2
1−ρ if phase 2 case
. (10)
Thus, to account for expectations, we need to estimate the ex ante likeli-
hood of an intervention for every merger j (ρj) and correct the CAARs mea-
sured around the announcement (ΠAfj) and the decision (ΠDfj) of that merger
according to equations (9) and (10). This refinement improves the precision
of the estimate of the market competitive assessment of a merger.
44If the market had perfect foresight, we would measure only white noise around the
decision. The surprise value of the decision is due to the private information generated
during the legal proceedings.
45The probability of a clearance subject to conditions and obligations is much higher for
phase 2 cases than for phase 1 cases; a blocking is possible only after a phase 2 investigation.
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Investigating Transatlantic Merger
Policy Convergence∗
Florian Szücs†
Abstract We propose a framework to examine tendencies of con-
vergence in the jurisdictional patterns of the American FTC and the
European Commission. Based on a sample of 493 merger cases scruti-
nized by on of these agencencies in the 1999 - 2007 period, we calibrate
logit models of the probability of intervening in a merger for both juris-
dictions and use them to predict the decisions of the respectively other
agency. The results point to an increasing harmonization of merger poli-
cies and corroborate the theoretical appraisal, that the 2004 reform of
EU merger law constituted a step towards the US system.
Introduction
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Directorate General for Compe-
tition (DG Competition) are among the most important regulatory authorities
in merger control worldwide. Their verdicts on merger cases can shape global
markets to a substantial degree and the scope of their jurisdictional compe-
tence extends far beyond national (or communal) borders. And yet these two
institutions differ greatly in history, method and aim: whereas US merger con-
trol - and antitrust in general - looks back on a long history, for the longest
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part of which it was shaped and developed in the spirit of a pro-competitive
doctrine with the goal of ensuring dynamic and efficient market structures,1
the common European competition authority is a relatively young institution
whose goals, like those of its predecessors, are more pluralistic in nature. While
ensuring competitive markets features prominently among DG Competition’s
objectives, issues of market integration, a distinct distrust for concentrated
markets and market foreclosure as well as political motives also play a role.2
This article attempts to evaluate empirically if and to what degree conver-
gence of US and European merger policies took place between 1999 and 2007.
This time period is a particularly interesting subject for an investigation of this
kind, because it includes data prior to and after the 2004 reform of European
merger law (ECMR04),3 which led to an increased use of economic analysis
in merger review (the ’more economic approach’) and was interpreted as a
step towards US policy (for example Verouden, Bengtsson, and Albaek (2004);
Coppi and Walker (2004); Bergman, Coate, Jakobsson, and Ulrick (2010)). We
explicitly address this issue by checking for changes in the coefficients of the
EU model after May 2004, including post-reform dummies in all regressions
and comparing post-reform European decisions to the jurisdictional patterns
of DG Competition and the FTC prior to the reform.
While the subject of convergence of merger policies has been discussed in
great detail from a theoretical point of view by legal and economic scholars
as well as practitioners, empirical evidence on the issue is sparse. The goal
1Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) give an overview of US antitrust from the Sherman Act to
Post-Chicago economic thinking, Mueller (1997) describes the historical development until
the nineties and surveys many empirical studies.
2Coppi and Walker (2004) and Shenefield (2004) discuss the different aims of US and com-
mon European competition law, Schwartz (1993) sketches the development of national Euro-
pean merger policies up to the common European Community Merger Regulation (ECMR)
of 1989, Cini and McGowan (1998) continue from there. The 2004 reform of European
merger policy is reviewed and evaluated in Lyons (2004) and Duso, Gugler, and Szücs
(2010). Bergman, Jakobsson, and Razo (2005) and Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007) provide
empirical studies on the determinants of an intervention by DG Competition.
3Regulation No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings.
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of this article is thus to quantitatively reassess the theoretical findings on
the convergence of transatlantic merger policies by empirical analysis. To do
this, a database containing 493 merger cases scrutinized by the FTC or DG
Competition (or, in rare cases, both) during the period from January 1999 to
December 2007 has been assembled to investigate whether their jurisdictions
have become increasingly similar. The notion of similarity is particularized by
employing two empirical measures of convergence developed in the literature.
Merger policy in the US is exercised by the FTC and its sister agency, the
Departement of Justice (DoJ). The division of merger cases between the two
agencies is effected on an (informal) industry basis. Since data on DoJ cases
are available only at an aggregate level, they cannot be used in the analysis
undertaken in this article, which requires detailed case information. Therefore,
this article’s conclusions, strictly speaking, only apply to US merger policy
as practiced by the FTC. However, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines,4
which constitute the basis of the merger assessment by both agencies and offer
detailed standard procedures, have been developed and published jointly by the
FTC and the DoJ since 1992. Therefore, issues of merger policy convergence
within the US are of much lesser concern than tendencies of convergence with
different juridical systems. It might thus be argued that the US cases contained
in the sample employed here can - at least when contrasted with a system
of competition policy, the dissimilarity of which arguably dwarves intra-US
discrepancies - be regarded as representative of US merger control.5
The findings of this empirical investigation are very much in line with those
of the theoretical literature: While there can be no talk of perfect convergence,
the progress made in terms of harmonization is substantial. After a period of
increasing dissonance until 2002/03, both jurisdictional systems seem to have
gradually improved their understanding of how merger control works on the
4Department of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, rev. 1997) and
Department of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010). See Shapiro (2010) for
a discussion of the evolution of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
5Potential biases due to the lack of DoJ data in the sample are addressed econometrically
in and .
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other side of the Atlantic. In particular, the 2004 reform of European merger
law seems to have been a substantial step towards US merger policy.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section summarizes
the history of policy convergence and reviews the relevant (economics and
political science) literature, section presents the data, section the methodology
employed. Results are presented in section . Section concludes.
Historical overview and literature
The general notion of policy convergence in competition policy has been a
subject of discussion for quite a while now. Scherer (1994, 1997) discusses the
general tendency of worldwide competition policy to approach pro-competitive
doctrines over the course of the twentieth century. The idea that competition
policy should ensure competitive markets seems self-evident from today’s point
of view, but at the beginning of the twentieth century only the US was actively
prosecuting monopolies and cartels (for example Kovacic and Shapiro (2000)).
In Europe and large parts of the rest of the world cartels were thought to
dampen the impact of business cycles (for example Audretsch (1989)), while
monopolies were deemed necessary to operate on efficient production scales
and compete internationally. The change towards a pro-competitive doctrine
came about after WW2, in the second half of the last century. In this sense,
there has undeniably been a lot of progress in the harmonization of competition
law. In this article, however, we take for granted that competition authorities
in general (political or other motives aside) pursue the goal of ensuring com-
petitive markets and instead focus on the convergence of their jurisdictional
patterns, that is, their decision to intervene in certain mergers and to clear
others.
More recent tendencies concerning the convergence and potential conflicts
in international competition law are considered in Calvani (2004). Calvani
examines the evolution of cooperation among competition authorities in the
period from 1990 to 2004, gives examples for areas of convergence and remain-
ing discrepancies and concludes in favor of harmonization. While Niels and
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Ten Kate (2004) focus on normative differences between the US and the EU
approach to competition law (economic vs. legalistic approach, treatment of
dominant firms etc.), Coppi and Walker (2004) discuss technical differences
in the evaluation of mergers (market definitions, econometric techniques, con-
centration measures, dominance vs. market power; the perceived ’unilateral
effects gap’ of pre-2004 European competition law is discussed in particular
depth). Shenefield (2004) argues in a similar vein, highlighting the role of dif-
ferent objectives in US an EU antitrust. All of them concede that while some
differences remain, tendencies of ’soft’ convergence are undeniable.
Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita (2005) detect differing views on verti-
cal policy on both sides of the Atlantic: While DG Competition takes vertical
agreements very seriously, US agencies have a more lenient regard of them.6 In
contrast, opinions on horizontal combinations (as expressed in the respective
’horizontal merger guidelines’: FTC (2010), DG Competition (2004)) seem
to be rather similar in both competition authorities (for example Verouden,
Bengtsson, and Albaek (2004)). Horlick and Meyer (1995) argue that compe-
tition policy convergence is especially noticable in merger control, because it is
in the interest of all countries concerned. In other areas of competition policy,
for example the regulation of subsidies and tariffs, international consent might
be harder to achieve due to conflicting national interests.
The topic of policy convergence is also discussed in the political science
literature. Even though this literature focuses mainly on tendencies of global
convergence of environmental and labor policies (for example Busch and Jo-
ergens (2005)), the driving forces for convergence identified can be assessed
with a regard to competition policy. The most frequently cited drivers for pol-
icy convergence (for example Drezner (2001)) are: i) a race-to-bottom (that
is, complete deregulation) mechanism fueled by economic pressure, ii) various
forms of institutionalism and iii) an epistemic communities approach.7 While
6To control for this possible area of divergence, the analysis is reapeated in a subsample
excluding non-horizontal mergers as a robustness check. See section .
7The epistemic communities approach is related to the elite consensus and the world
society approaches, which are not discussed separately in this brief overview. Holzinger and
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mechanism i) (a ’race of deregulation’ among nations) seems implausible in
competition policy, ii) arguably does play a role in the harmonization of global
antitrust: institutions like the International Competition Network (ICN) or
the World Trade Organization (WTO) certainly have their part in levelling
competition policies around the globe. Van Waarden and Drahos (2002) pro-
pose, that the epistemic communities approach is most suited for explaining
the convergence of competition policies. This approach postulates that the
emergence of a community of legally trained officials - with similar epistemic
beliefs - provides a channel for the international diffusion of ideas, methods
and practices, which - in turn - cause convergence. See Haas (1992) for an
introduction to the topic.
To make the rather vague concept of ’convergence of policies’ more tangible,
several concepts of convergence have been developed in the literature (see for
example Sala-i-Martin (1996a,b); Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer (2005)). The
concepts of convergence relevant for the purposes of this article are discussed
in .
Data
The data used in this analysis were created by combining two datasets on
mergers, one containing EU cases, one containing US cases. The EU dataset
comprises 310 merger cases handled by DG Competition in the time period
from 1990 to 2007. The US dataset contains 420 FTC cases, which were
assessed between 1999 and 2009.8 The analysis is restricted to the overlap
period of 1999 to 2007, for which there are observations on both agencies,
allowing for a direct comparison. 226 EU cases and 267 US cases (493 cases
Knill (2005) review the causes of policy convergence in the political science literature in
greater detail.
8Actually, the US sample contains about 50 cases decided prior to 1999 all of which are
interventions, since data on clearances were not available for that period. These observations
are thus used for the calibration of logit models only.
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in total) fall into this time period; the remaining observations are used for the
calibration of the binary decision models only.
The EU cases were collected from DG Competition’s homepage.9 Going
through the decisions, the merging parties and the outcome of the investi-
gation was recorded. Similarly, the US cases were obtained from the data
available on the FTC homepage,10 again identifying merging parties and out-
come. The Hoover’s11 database was used to determine the primary competitors
in each merger case. The companies (merging parties and their competitors
from US and EU cases) were then linked to the Thomson Reuters Worldscope
database,12 from which data on market values, R&D expenditures, dividends,
industry classification, geographic location and other structural characteristics
were downloaded. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the dataset.13
9http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/.
10http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/index.shtm.
11http://www.hoovers.com/.
12http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/financial_products
/products_az/worldscope_fundamentals.
13A total of 235 merger cases of our sample, 83 DG Competition and 152 FTC cases,
were decided in the time periods from 1990-1998 or 2008-2009 respectively and are thus not
included in the summary statistics. The characteristics of these cases do not significantly
differ from those reported in tables 1 and 2.
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The average rate of intervention (Action, the terms ’action’ and ’interven-
tion’ are used interchangeably thoughout this article) in the sample is 49.9%
and higher in EU cases (56%) than in US cases (42%).14 The main difference
between the US and EU subsamples lies in the size of the mergers: the market
values and R&D expenditures of merging parties and rivals are higher in US
mergers than in European mergers, whereas European merging parties seem to
pay (relatively) higher dividends. US and EU cases therefore are, to a degree,
structurally different. This issue is explicitly adressed in section , where the
analysis is restricted to propensity-score matched subsamples to control for
the possibility of a sample selection bias. The majority of cases (about 2/3 in
the EU and slightly less than 3/4 in the US) can be classified as ’horizontal’,
that is, mergers between competing firms.15 The duration is defined as the
number of days between the announcement (the date at which the financial
press first wrote about the combination) and the publication of the decision
by the agency.16 Since the duration is on average substantially longer in the
US (the EU enforces a strict time schedule), we use a variable containing the
quartiles of the regime-specific duration in the logit regressions to increase
comparability across regimes.
The variables not reported in tables 1 and 2 are the approximated market
shares of merging parties and their biggest competitor, industry dummies and
dummies for the involvement of EU/US firms in a merger. We use the ratio of
sales by merging parties and competitors as a proxy for the merging parties’
market share (average EU: 31%, average US: 17%); similarly, the share of
14Less than 5% of the cases in the sample were either prohibited by DG Competition or
abandoned after the FTC succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injuction in court. Since the
focus of this article lies on the decision to intervene in a merger and not on the choice or
adequateness of the measure of intervention, these cases are not distinguished from other
remedies. In section we run a robustness check excluding these cases.
15Since the FTC does not publish its economic assessment, this measure is based on
industry classification codes.
16This includes the timeframe between the merger becoming known and the date of its
notification to the authority, as well as weekends and festivities and therefore does not
strictly correspond to the duration of the investigation.
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sales by the largest competitors (EU: 47%, US: 41%) is a further indicator of
market concentration. The decomposition into industry branches is similar in
both jurisdictions: A majority of mergers in manufacturing (EU: 62%, US:
71%) and transport & communications (EU: 23%, US: 10%), along with some
in trade (EU: 7%, US: 9%) and services (EU: 7%, US: 15%) are complemented
by relatively few mergers in the finance (EU: 3%, US: 1%) and mining &
construction (EU: 6%, US: 2%) industries. Since these dummies are based on
industry classification variables, they are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. The
meansof the dummies for involvement of US/EU companies in a merger are
high in both jurisdictions with more US firms being involved in US mergers
and vice versa.
Methodology
This section outlines this article’s approach to policy convergence, discusses
the concepts and measures of convergence employed and presents some de-
tails concerning the propensity score matching procedure we use to obtain a
homogenous subsample.
Approach
The keystone of this inquiry in policy convergence are logit models, which em-
ulate the decisions to either intervene or clear a merger case by the FTC and
DG Competition. The dependent variable, action (equal to zero if the case
was cleared, equal to one if it was either remedied or blocked), is regressed
on possible determinants: dummies for horizontal mergers, the involvement
of EU/US companies, industry and political dummies, as well as the market
values, R&D expenditures and dividends of both merging parties and rivals in
the merger, two variables proxying for the market shares of merging parties
and the biggest competitor and a variable indicating the duration of the inves-
tigation. To calibrate these models, the whole sample of merger cases is used
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(310 observations for the EU model, 420 for the US model). The models are
presented in section .
These logit models are then used to predict the likelihood of an inter-
vention in cases handled by the respectively other competition authority, the
counterfactual decision. That is, the US logit model is used to predict the
probability with which the FTC would have intervened in EU cases and vice
versa. The degree of compliance between the actual decision in a merger case
by one competition authority and the counterfactual decision (predicted by
the logit model) of the other is - evaluated over time - the basis of the analysis
of jurisdictional convergence.
Do the model coefficients change over time?
Pooling all observations into a single model for each jurisdiction means implic-
itly assuming that both jurisdictions can be regarded as static constructs over
the whole sample period. While continuity and predictability are desirable
traits of a merger control authority, this is a strong assumption which has to
be justified. We address this issue by first identifying points in time at which
structural breaks in competition policy could plausibly occur, then estimating
the jurisdictional models in the non-overlapping partitions thus defined and
using a generalized Hausman specification test to compare these restricted
models to the unrestricted model. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test
is, that there is no systematic difference in the model coefficients. If this is
rejected, separate models will have to be estimated for the periods in question.
In the US sample, the most plausible points to test for structural breaks
(following Bergman, Coate, Jakobsson, and Ulrick (2010)) are potential regime
changes due to changing FTC chairmen. The sample period includes the terms
of Timothy Muris and Deborah Platt Majoras.17 Timothy Muris’ term (June
17The term of Robert Pitofsky (1995 - 2001) is partially contained in the sample as well.
Although we do not have sufficient data to test for regime changes during his chairmanship,
Coate and Ulrick (2006) find no statistically significant difference in enforcement between the
terms of Robert Pitofsky and Timothy Muris and conclude that ’[. . . ] merger enforcement
policy has remained relatively stable during the 1996 to 2003 time period’.
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2001 - April 2004) contains 100 observations and 124 further cases were handled
during Deborah Platt Majoras’ term from May 2004 to May 2008. We thus
estimate two logit models, restricted to these terms of office, in the same
specification18 as reported in , and compare them to the unrestricted model,
estimated using all US observations. Most of the coefficients are similar in size
and equal in sign across all three models (differences occur mainly in industry
dummies) and the Hausman test does not reject the null hypotheses of equal
coefficients to the unrestricted model during the Muris term (p = 0.45) and
during the Majoras term (p = 0.61). This continuity in US merger control in
our sample may well be due to the fact that the whole sample falls between
the 1997 revision of merger guidelines and the publication of the 2010 merger
guidelines. Thus, while US merger policy certainly was not perfectly static,
there are no obvious discontinuities in our data on US merger control, allowing
us to pool all US observations.19 While the results of the restricted models
(which are not significantly different from the unrestricted model) are omitted
for the sake of brevity, the model containing all US cases is reported in .
The most obvious potential regime change in our data on European merger
control is due to the major changes in European merger legislation brought
about by the ECMR04. We thus estimate two models of EU jurisdiction, one
prior to and one after the reform in May 2004, and compare them to the EU
model containing the whole sample period. Again, a Hausman test is employed
to compare the model coefficients. While the Hausman test does not reject
the null hypothesis in the pre-reform period (p = 0.56), there is a significant
difference in coefficients when comparing the post-reform period to the whole
sample of EU cases (p = 0.04). Thus, the perceived major impact of the 2004
reform on European merger (for example Drauz and Reynolds (2003)) law is
reflected in the data and will have to be made allowance for by using separate
18Minus the political control variables, which are not necessary in the subsamples consid-
ered here.
19Similarly, Leary (2002) concludes in favor of essential stability of US merger policy in
the 1980ies and 90ies.
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models of EU jurisdiction for the periods prior to and after it. The two EU
models are reported in as well.
Propensity score matching
As mentioned in section , the observations in the US and EU subsamples are to
a certain degree different with regard to the characteristics we observe: while
market values and R&D spending are higher for US merging firms and rivals in
the sample, EU merging firms pay higher dividends. Industry dummies differ
across the subsamples as well. This could be either due to differences in the
kind of mergers that are being investigated in the US and Europe, or due to
the limitation of our sample to FTC cases for a lack of DoJ data. We address
this issue explicitly via the use of propensity score matching.
Propensity score matching (PSM) was developed by Rosenbaum (1983) and
is used to reduce the bias due to sample selection.20 The concept is frequently
applied to the experimental design in the medical sciences: when trying to
single out the effect of a treatment, the subjects of the control group should
be as similar as possible to those of the treated group. The PSM algorithm
provides a measure of similarness based on a set of covariates.
In the context of our analysis, being ’treated’ means being handled by
one competition authority (the problem is symmetric) and the PSM algorithm
will select a sample of cases of the other competition authority. The sample
thus obtained will be more uniform with respect to the specified covariates.
Notice that in this setting there is not one ’treated’ and one ’control’ group,
but actually two treated groups. We thus divert the algorithm from its origi-
nally intended use (singling out a causal effect between treatment and control
groups) and employ it to increase the similarity of two subsamples.
The covariates used to calculate the propensity score are: dummies for
horizontal mergers, US and EU firms and industry dummies, as well as market
values, R&D spending, dividends and a variable indicating the duration of the
investigation. We use a version of the PSM algorithm developed for Stata
20For an application to mergers see Weichselbaumer (2008).
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by Leuven and Sianesi (2003), modified to find unique best matches within
the same year and removing them from the pool after matching. Thus, the
algorithm calculates the matrix of propensity scores between all EU and US
cases in a given year, finds the best match (the lowest propensity score) and
removes the two cases thus matched from the pool. Then the second best
match is selected and so on. Calibrating the algorithm such, that after the
matching procedure the average difference in propensity scores of the yearly
matches (the average structural difference of cases in the subsample, based on
the above covariates) stays around 5%, determines the amount of matches per
year at 14. This yields 28 merger cases per year from 1999 - 2007, producing
a subsample of 252 cases in total.
All of the results presented in the next section will be iterated in this
subsample. While the whole sample contains the maximum amount of cases
available to us and thus allows the most surveying picture of the two juris-
dictional systems, the matched subsample is designed to eliminate effects that
arise due to differences in the types of cases the two authorities handle.
Concepts and Measures of Convergence
At least four types of convergence can be found in the relevant literature: β-,
γ-, δ- and σ-convergence. While β-convergence is mostly used in the literature
on economic growth (catching-up processes) and γ-convergence is concerned
with the mobility of countries in country-rankings at different points in time,
the concepts of δ- and σ-convergence can be readily applied to the purposes of
this analysis.
σ-convergence, named after the algebraic notation for standard deviation,
occurs when the dispersion of two time series decreases over time. In the
growth literature, this means that the absolute difference between the GDP
levels under investigation declines. Applied to competition policy, the concept
is a bit more complex. We will say that two competition policies (as manifested
in the patterns of jurisdiction by the respective agencies) exhibit decreasing
dispersion and therefore σ-convergence if the absolute difference of their pre-
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dictions decreases over time. That is, two agencies σ-converge if their decisions
on the same cases become more similar over time. Since the subsample of cases
which were scrutinized by both the FTC and DG Competition (the ’overlap’ of
jurisdictions) is too small for statistical analysis, the following workaround will
be applied: Using logit models calibrated to the jurisdictions of the FTC and
DG Competition, we will predict the ex ante likelihood of an intervention for
all cases from the point of view of both agencies. Thus, we simulate a scenario
in which all cases in our sample were handled by both competition authorities.
This makes the verification of σ-convergence straightforward: σ-convergence
occurs in our sample if the absolute difference of predictions by the two models
decreases over time; that is, if the ’variance of jurisdiction’ of the two agencies
diminishes.
Formally, the absolute difference of predictions in merger i is defined as
σi =
∣∣PUSi (action)− PEUi (action)∣∣ , (1)
where P ji (action) (j = US,EU) is the predicted probability of an intervention
by agency j in merger i. σ-convergence occurs if limi→∞ σi = 0, but in a finite
sample we will conclude in favor of σ-convergence if the average σi decreases
over time, while an increase would imply divergence.
δ-convergence, named after the algebraic notation for distance in topolog-
ical space, is defined in Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer (2005) as ’decreasing
distance of policies towards an exemplary model’. This point of reference, the
’exemplary model’, could be a frontrunner country or a purely abstract ideal
state of policy. To investigate the existence of δ-convergence in our sample,
we are going to use the model of one agency to predict the decisions of the
other (the counterfactual decision) and assess to which degree the predictions
are correct.21
We calculate the prediction errors of the model of agency j in predicting
the decisions of the other agency, −j, in merger i as
δji =
∣∣action−ji − P ji (action)∣∣ , (2)
21When talking of the ’correctness’ of decisions, we always refer to ’agreement with the
actual outcome’ and not correctness with respect to some welfare criterion.
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where action−ji is the decision of agency −j in merger i (equal to one if an
intervention took place in merger i and zero otherwise) and P ji is defined as
above. Based on this, we investigate whether the actual decisions by one
competition authority converge towards the counterfactual decisions of the
other competition authority, that is, if limi→∞ δji = 0. We will conclude that
agency −j δ-converges towards agency j, if the agreement of decisions by −j
and predictions by the model of j increases over time, that is, if δji decreases.
If the performance of one logit model is constant with regard to these mea-
sures, the merger policy of the agency, whose decisions are being predicted
by the model has remained unchanged in comparison with the merger policy
embodied in the model. If, conversely, a model gets better at predicting the
other competition authority’s decisions over time, the jurisdiction of the pre-
dicted entity has become increasingly similar to the modelled entity and has
thus δ-converged towards the jurisdiction captured in the model (a catching-
up process). If a model gets worse, the jurisdiction of the other entity has
become more dissimilar. If the predictions of both models improve, we observe
bilateral tendencies of harmonization: both jurisdictions δ-converge towards
each other.
Results
Logit Models
To simulate the patterns of jurisdiction of the two competition authorities,
three logit models are calibrated using the subsamples of US cases, EU cases
prior to ECMR04 and EU cases post-ECMR04. For the purpose of the esti-
mation of these models, all available cases (including those beyond the 1999 -
2007 window) are used, providing 420 observations for the US model and 212
and 98 observations for the EU models respectively. The dependent variable
in all models is action, the decision to either clear a merger or intervene. Table
3 contains the results.
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Table 3: Logit Models: Probability of Intervention
EU model pre EU model post US model
Horizontal mergers 0.737 −1.266 −0.030
(0.554) (0.815) (0.429)
US dummy −1.255∗ −0.124 −1.620∗∗∗
(0.644) (0.882) (0.600)
EU dummy −1.702∗∗∗ 0.185 −0.355
(0.663) (0.825) (0.611)
Market value merging 0.281∗∗∗ 0.164 0.000
(0.082) (0.193) (0.136)
Market value rivals 0.252∗∗∗ 0.221 0.265
(0.078) (0.225) (0.182)
R&D merging −0.384∗∗∗ −0.625∗∗∗ −0.180
(0.133) (0.216) (0.132)
R&D rivals −0.118 −0.239 −0.529∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.209) (0.163)
Dividends merging 0.012 0.027∗ 0.006
(0.008) (0.016) (0.007)
Dividends rivals 0.001 0.012∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Duration of proceedings 2.225∗∗∗ 1.976∗∗∗ 2.691∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.478) (0.306)
Share of sales biggest rival −0.265 2.843 2.735∗
(1.374) (2.673) (1.431)
Share of sales merging −0.274 1.767 0.292
(1.422) (2.573) (1.654)
Bush administration −0.624 −1.785∗∗∗
(0.660) (0.527)
Observations 212 98 420
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.51 0.68
Correctly Classified 87% 89% 91%
Standard errors in parentheses, the symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Regression includes controls for the political
environment (EU Commissioners and US presidents) and industry effects.
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Prior to the 2004 reform of European merger law, the main drivers for
an intervention by DG Competition were the market values of both merging
parties (proxying for the importance of the transaction) and rivals (proxying
for market size). As predicted by economic theory, R&D-intensive markets
received less regulatory attention. Political factors seem to have played an im-
portant role as well: firms originating from the EU or from the US were treated
preferably in comparison to firms from other parts of the world, EU firms even
more so than US firms. Finally, a longer duration of the investigation increased
the likelihood of an intervention.22
Post-reform, the determinants for an intervention of DG Competition change
substantially: among the significant results, only those for R&D-intensive mar-
kets and duration remain. The effect of the duration of proceedings slightly
decreases in comparison to the pre-reform model, possibly reflecting the in-
creased focus on phase 1 remedies. In contrast to the pre-reform model, the
dividends of both merging parties and rivals (proxying for the maturity and
profitability of the industry) now increase the likelihood of an action, while
lobbying by US and EU firms no longer has an impact on the decision.
The FTC is less likely to intervene in mergers involving US-based firms.
While higher industry profits - as proxied by rivals’ dividends - increase the
probability of an intervention, R&D spending of rivals decreases it. The effects
of the duration of an investigation is stronger than in the EU models. The
share of industry sales held by the largest competitor indicates the degree of
industry concentration and increases the likelihood of an action. Whereas the
Bush administration had no significant effect on European merger control,23 it
significantly facilitated merging activity in the US.
22We tackled the possible endogeneity of the duration of investigation variable by spec-
ifying instrumental variable models treating it as endogenous and using regime variables
(commissioners/chairmen) as excluded exogenous variables. Employing both two-stage least
squares and maximum-likelihood estimation, we could not reject the null hypothesis of ex-
ogeneity in any of the models.
23The coefficient in the post reform period - ranging from May 2004 to December 2007 -
could not be estimated due to perfect collinearity.
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While the size and significance of coefficients vary across the models, the
signs of the six continuous economic variables (market values, R&D spending
and dividends of both merging parties and rivals), which constitute the corner-
stone of economic analysis, do not change: in all specifications, the likelihood
of an intervention increases with market values and dividends (size and ma-
turity/profitability) and is decreased by R&D spending (innovations, market
dynamics). The share of sales by merging parties in relation to their rivals, on
the other hand, is insignificant in all three specifications. Either the agencies
are not influenced by simplistic market-share considerations, or sales ratios are
a too vague proxy for them.
The goodness of fit measures are very good in all models: R2s of 56% and
51% in the EU models and 68% in the US model permit the correct classifica-
tion of 87%, 89% and 91% of observations respectively. The fact that the US
model fares better in terms of both measures indicates that the FTC’s juris-
diction can be better explained by circumstantial information (as employed in
the model) than the decisions by the European Commission. Furthermore, the
predictability of European merger control seems to have decreased in the post-
ECMR04 period. In spite of the smaller sample size, the R2 of the post-reform
model is 5% lower. Thus the FTC’s decisions appear to be more transparent
than those of DG Competition.
Convergence
In this section we use the logit models estimated in to predict probabilities
of intervention and apply the measures discussed in to the predictions. All
the figures include a scatterplot containing the data-points (top and bottom
percentile excluded for visual clarity), a restricted cubic smoothing spline of
the data (as implemented in Cox (2007), intended as a visual aid) and a plot of
the predictions of a linear model, regressing the data on a general time-trend
and a time-trend restricted to the period after May 2004 (the post-reform
period). The coefficients of the time-trend regressions are reported in table 4.
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Figure 1: Difference in predictions
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Difference in predictions by EU and US models on all cases in sample. For clarity’s sake,
the scatterplots omit the top and bottom percentiles of values.
Figure 1 reports the difference in the predictions by the EU and US models,
the measure of σ-convergence, for each merger case in the sample in the 1999
- 2007 period (493 observations).
The predictions of the two models differ by about 12% on average at the
beginning of the sample period. This difference increases to about 24% until
2002/03 and then steadily declines from 2004 on. While the yearly maximum
occurs in 2002, the spline suggests a peak during the course of 2003. Thus
both measures place the peak of incongruity before the coming-into-force of
ECMR04 in May 2004, suggesting that the changes in merger law might have
been anticipated by legal practice. The plotted regression shows a significant
and positive trend for the pre-reform period. The coefficient (see table 4)
suggests a yearly increase in the difference of predictions by 2.6%. Post-reform,
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Figure 2: Prediction errors of EU model
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Difference between EU model predictions of US cases and actual outcomes. For clarity’s
sake, the scatterplots omit the top and bottom percentiles of values.
this trend is superseded by a negative trend of - 5.2%, significant at the 1%
level. The net effect of the two trends is a yearly reduction of the difference
by 2.6%. Since the decline of this measure is equivalent to a reduction in
the variance between the two underlying time-series, figure 1 indicates strong
tendencies of σ-convergence between EU and US merger policies from 2004
until 2007. More than half of the difference in predictions vanishes during that
period.24
Figures 2 and 3 show the prediction errors of both models in predicting
decisions by the respectively other agency.
24The negative trend continues in 2008 and 2009. 2008/09 data are not included in the
graph, because they contain only US observations.
87
Figure 3: Prediction errors of US model
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Difference between US model predictions of EU cases and actual outcomes. For clarity’s
sake, the scatterplots omit the top and bottom percentiles of values.
Table 4: Time Trends
Difference EU model error US model error
Year 0.026∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.037∗
(0.008) (0.016) (0.019)
Post-reform year −0.052∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.013) (0.026) (0.032)
Observations 493 267 226
Robust standard errors in parentheses, the symbols ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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While the two fitted splines exhibit different dynamics (slow increase until
2005 followed by a slump in the EU model; initial decrease, followed by a sharp
increase and again decrease from 2004 on in the US model), both substantially
decrease in the post-reform period. The regression plots show a similar picture:
after a period of increasing prediction errors prior to the reform (EU model:
+2.9% annually, US model: +3.7% annually, both significant at the 10% level),
the trend turns negative afterwards (EU: -5.8% annually, US: -6.3% annually,
both significant at the 5% level).
Thus, while both jurisdictions started out on relatively similar ground in
1999 (with average prediction errors of about 0.2 each), they became increas-
ingly alien to one another up to the years 2003/2004 (the maximum average
prediction error of the US model, 0.46, occurs in 2003, that of the EU model,
0.40, in 2004). After this point, strong tendencies of δ-convergence can be ob-
served until the end of the sample period, when the yearly average prediction
errors of the EU model reach their minimum (0.17). Yearly average prediction
errors of the US model are slightly lower in 2001 (0.18) than in 2007 (0.19),
but 2007 is the minimum among post-reform observations.
Summing up, all of the above measures seem to agree, that after a peak of
incongruity in transatlantic merger control between 2002 and 2004, substantial
convergence of jurisdictional patterns occured in the second half of the sam-
ple period, presumably in relation with the institutional changes in European
merger law triggered by ECMR04. In the post-reform period, both the predic-
tion errors and the differences in predictions of both models decline, signifying
δ− and σ−convergence respectively. This is a first empirical indication, that
the 2004 reform of European merger law was indeed a step towards the US
system. We will try to further substantiate this finding in section .
Convergence post-ECMR04
As shown above, the EU merger policy reform of 2004 constituted a major
shift in the direction of European merger control (see also Duso, Gugler, and
Szücs (2010)). This shift has been interpreted as a step towards US merger
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policy on theoretical and legal grounds (for example Verouden, Bengtsson, and
Albaek (2004); Rusu (2007); Bergman, Coate, Jakobsson, and Ulrick (2010)).
To empirically investigate this hypothesis the following framework is pro-
posed: The logit models of the decisions of both FTC and DG Competition
are estimated with all available data up to May 2004 (the month in which
ECMR04 came into force) and then used to predict the decision of DG Com-
petition after the reform.25 Calculating the prediction errors of both models
with respect to the actual EU decisions will allow us to infer the proximity of
the actual jurisdiction to the US and the EU models.
Figure 4 reports the prediction errors of the (pre May 2004) EU and US
logit models in forecasting EU decisions in the June 2004 - December 2007
period (98 observations).
As illustrated by the fitted curves, the prediction errors of the EU model
are, on average, larger than the prediction errors of the US model during the
whole period. This suggests that post-ECMR04 European merger control is
better understood by the pre-ECMR04 FTC than by pre-ECMR04 DG Com-
petition. The difference between the average prediction errors of the EU model
(0.28) and the US model (0.23) is highly significant (p = 0.01). Unsurprisingly,
the FTC model is also - again, p = 0.01 - better at predicting its own post-
ECMR04 decisions. This corroborates the conjecture that the evolution of US
merger control in the sample period is a continuous one, whereas the ECMR04
significantly altered European merger policy.
Since the findings presented in this section are based on sparse data (98
observations), covering a timeframe of only 3 (and a half) years, their nature
is more indicative than conclusive. Still, the results of this empirical inquiry
are in accord with the widespread opinion among practitioners and scholars
that the 2004 EU merger policy reform constituted a step towards US merger
policy.
25The results of the two logit models are similar to those in section and are not separately
reported here.
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Figure 4: Predicting post-reform EU decisions
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Prediction errors when using pre-ECMR04 models to predict post-ECMR04 EU cases. For
clarity’s sake, the scatterplots omit the top and bottom percentiles of values.
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Convergence in Matched Subsample
We repeat the exercise conducted in the previous section in a propensity-
score matched subsample (containing 252 observations) to account for possible
structural heterogeneity of the merger cases in our sample. We estimate the
same logit models (except for some industry and political dummies which had
to be dropped by the regression algorithm in the smaller sample) as in table
3 and employ the same measures of convergence as before. The results are
reported in figure 5.
Essentially, all the conclusions inferred in the whole sample can be main-
tained in face of the subsample-results. The two graphs containing the predic-
tion errors of the EU and the US model (panels (a) and (b)) strongly resemble
those reported in section , with on average higher prediction errors in the sub-
sample. This is due to the decreased accuracy of the logit models calibrated
in the smaller sample. The smaller sample size also affects the significance of
the time-trend regressions: the positive pre-reform trends in prediction errors
are insignificant in both models, the same applies to the negative post-reform
trend in the US model. In the EU model, the post-reform trend remains sig-
nificantly (5% level) negative and corresponds to an annual decrease of 10.7%
in prediction errors.
The difference in predictions (panel (c)) shows less pre-reform volatility
and higher differences than in the whole sample, with the average difference
hovering around 20%. The increasing trend is significant at the 10% level
(+2.6% per anno). The negative time-trend after the reform is even stronger
(-7.1% per anno) than in the whole sample and significant at the 1% level,
inducing a net effect of -4.5% per year after the reform. The predictions
of the pre-reform US model still outperform those of the corresponding EU
model (pandel (d)). The average difference of the predictions by both models
increases from 0.05 to 0.11, but the significance is slightly reduced (p = 0.04)
due to the smaller sample size (n = 51).
Overall, the gain from controlling for differences between US and European
mergers seems to be exceeded by the loss from dropping half of the sample:
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the quality of the logit models suffers from the small amount of observations in
the subsample and, since none of the results essentially change, the structural
differences of mergers in the sample are apparently not overly important.
Robustness Checks
This section briefly discusses the results of a number of robustness checks which
were performed on the data.
Horizontal mergers
Dropping all non-horizontal mergers reduces the EU sample to 201 and the
US sample to 310 observations. While the difference in prediction errors after
ECMR04 becomes insignificant (p = 0.11, due to the smaller sample size, the
actual difference remains), all other results reported in are robust to this.
Prohibited and abandoned mergers
About 4% of cases in the EU sample were blocked by DG Competition. Sim-
ilarly, 4% of the US sample mergers were abandoned by the parties after the
FTC obtained a preliminary injuction in court. Since these cases were consid-
ered strongly anticompetitive by the respective competition authorities, they
are potential outliers in comparison with the rest of the sample. Dropping
these cases slightly improves the significances of the prediction error time-
trends, while the significance of the post-reform difference in predictions is
marginally reduced (p = 0.02). All other results remain unchanged.
Calibrate using only sample data
The logit models employed are calibrated using some observations on US and
EU merger control outside the sample period 1999-2007. Dropping those ob-
servations improves some of the time-trend signficances, but reduces the sigif-
icance of the difference in post-ECMR prediction errors (p = 0.08).
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Control for industry dissimilarities
Some of the industry dummies (reported in section ) differ substantially among
the EU and US sample. The dummies for the finance and transport & com-
munications industries have significantly higher means in the EU sample, since
in the US these industries are routinely regulated by the DoJ. Dropping all
observations in these industries reduces the EU sample size to 169 and the US
sample size to 238. Estimating in these samples slightly reduces the signifi-
cance of the difference in post-ECMR04 predictions errors (p = 0.04), while
leaving other results qualitatively unchanged.
Conclusion
The degree of coherence of globally effective merger policies, such as those
exercised by the EU and the US, is highly relevant from both the firms’ point
of view as well as that of economic efficiency. Since policies are never perfectly
static constructs - merger policy in particular has seen radical changes in the
last decades -, not only the degree of coherence matters, but also whether
the policies converge or diverge. We attempt to address the questions raised
by these observations in an empirical framework by applying notions of con-
vergence developed in the growth and political science literature to merger
control.
While merger policy in the US evolved continuously during the sample pe-
riod (models restricted to the terms of individual chairmen are not significantly
different from the unrestricted model), EU merger policy experienced a major
shift induced by the reform of European merger law in 2004. In line with the
theoretical literature on the topic, the empirical models presented here indi-
cate that the effect of the reform was a step towards greater coherence with
US merger law. In particular, the logit model calibrated with US data predicts
the outcomes of post-reform EU merger cases significantly better than the EU
model, suggesting the European merger control after the reform is relatively
nearer to US merger control than to the pre-reform EU system. All estimated
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time trends of prediction errors by the two models turn significantly negative
in the periods after the reform, indicating increasing consent of the underlying
jurisdictions.
Shortly before the reform, however, the coherence of merger policies seems
to be at its lowest level in the sample period. One plausible explanation for
this finding is that the European Court of First Instance overruled three of
the Commission’s decisions to block mergers during 2002 and criticized the
economic analyses conducted in these cases. These politically embarrasing
overrulings may well have caused unsettling repercussions in EU merger con-
trol, which were only subdued by the increased focus on economic analysis
introduced by the reform.
The coherence of the two systems is largest at the end of the sample period:
the differences in the predictions by both models as well as the prediction errors
of the models in forecasting decisions by the respectively other agency are at
very low levels and exhibit a downward trend. It thus seems that substantial
convergence was achieved in the last few years and that we may hope that this
trend is still at work.
Robustness Checks Results
Figure 6 contains the graphical results when the robustness checks discussed
in section are applied. The first row shows the four main graphs (difference in
model predictions, EU model prediction errors, US model prediction errors and
post-reform prediction errors) when only horizontal mergers are considered.
In the second row, prohibited and abandoned mergers are removed from the
sample. The third row reports the results obtained, when only sample data
(that is, observations between 1999 and 2007) are used to calibrate all models.
Finally, in the forth row the finance, transport and communications sectors
were dropped from the sample.
As discussed in section , all main results are quite robust to these checks.
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M&A and R&D: Asymmetric Effects on
Acquirers and Targets?∗
Florian Szücs†
Abstract We evaluate the impact of M&A activity on the growth of
R&D spending and R&D intensity of 265 acquiring firms and 133 merger
targets in the time period ranging from 1990 to 2009. We use a range
of matching techniques to construct separate control groups for acquir-
ers and targets and use appropriate difference-in-difference estimation
methods to single out the causal effect of mergers on R&D growth and
intensity. We find a significant reduction of R&D efforts by both acquir-
ers and targets in the periods after the merger, pointing to a decrease
of the incentive to innovate.
Introduction
The present paper continues to investigate the nexus between corporate merg-
ers and the incentive of firms to allocate resources to innovation activities and
hopes to overcome some of the shortcomings of previous efforts on the same
issue. This paper’s main contribution is probably the explicit differentiation of
effects on acquirers and targets. Previous studies have included both acquir-
ing firms and merger targets in their analysis (Cassiman et al. (2005); Ornaghi
(2009)), but effects were measured in a pooled setting, due to either small
sample sizes or the inability to differentiate the correct roles.
∗I would like to thank Klaus Gugler as well as participants of the 4th ZEW Conference
on Innovation and Patenting for valuable comments. The author gratefully acknowledges
financial support from Österreichische Nationalbank through Jubiläumsfonds project 14075.
†Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institute of Quantitative Economics,
Augasse 2 - 6, A-1090 Vienna, Austria. E-mail: florian.szuecs@wu.ac.at
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Furthermore, earlier studies on the subject matter where usually either of
limited geographical scope (Bertrand (2009); Stiebale and Reize (2011)) or re-
stricted to certain industries (Bertrand and Zitouna (2008); Ornaghi (2009)).
The database utilized in this study contains firms from most major industrial-
ized nations, active in numerous different industries. Thus we hope to overcome
any industry or country-specific effects and provide a surveying picture of the
phenomena in question.
Restructuring R&D activities is a protracted affair that can take a number
of years to complete. Therefore the explanatory power of short-term studies on
the topic is limited. To account for the relevant time horizon, we use balance
sheet data from up to 6 periods after the acquisition year. Time windows of
[t+ 1, t+ 6] years after the acquisition year t allow us to check for drawn-out
restructuring efforts after it. While we use pre-merger data (period t−1) in the
estimation of the ex-ante probability to merge, data from the merger period
t are excluded from the analysis to avoid the measurement of consolidation
effects of the combination.
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the empirical discussion on the
relationship between mergers and the incentive to conduct innovative efforts.
We therefore analyze the effect of mergers on two measures of R&D inputs:
the growth of R&D expenditures and R&D intensity, defined as the ratio of
R&D expenditures over sales. By making R&D inputs instead of R&D outputs
(patents, new products) the focus of the analysis, we examine the firms’ will-
ingness to invest in innovation instead of their success in attaining it. Thus,
questions about synergies and changes in the efficiency of research are not
addressed by this paper. However, Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) show that
measures of R&D inputs and outputs are highly correlated and conclude that
there is no major systemic disparity between them.
A much-discussed issue in the evaluation of non-experimental data concerns
the issues of missing data and self-selection. The basic problem is that, in a
non-experimental setting, self-selection into the ’treated’ group cannot be ruled
out and thus receiving the treatment might be non-random, confounding the
measurement of the causal effect of treatment. Therefore great care has to
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be taken in the construction of an appropriate control group as well as in the
specification of the empirical strategy to derive reliable results.
In this respect, we follow the suggestion of Blundell and Costa Dias (2000)
and combine matching techniques with difference-in-difference estimation.
Three different matching techniques (nearest-neighbor matching, Mahalanobis
metric matching, caliper matching) and a very rich pool of potential control
observations are used in the construction of the control groups, in which the
difference-in-difference estimation is then performed. In each case, separate
control groups are constructed for acquirers and targets to account for firm
heterogeneity due to their roles in the transaction. Estimation results are
reported in all three samples thus obtained.
When estimating the ex-ante probability to be involved in a merger, we find
similar determinants for acquirers and targets: high values of R&D intensity,
total assets and employees increase both the probability of being an acquirer
or a target. The firms’ profitability, on the other hand, raises the probability
of being an acquirer and decreases that of being a target: acquirers are signif-
icantly more and targets are significantly less profitable than the average firm
in the sample.
In the early periods after the merger, acquirers do not differ significantly
from the control group in terms of R&D growth. We find some negative growth
effects from t + 2 to t + 5, though only the effect in t + 5 is significant in all
specifications. The R&D growth of merger targets, conversely, drops sharply
relative to the control group in all periods from t+1 to t+5 after the acquisition
and all specifications.
The effects on R&D intensity are negative as well: while both groups start
out at very high levels of R&D intensity (the average pre-merger R&D inten-
sity of acquirers is between 6 and 7%, that of targets is approximately 8%)
this changes significantly after the acquisition. We measure highly significant
negative effects on acquirers in all periods (t+ 2 to t+ 6) and all specifications
suggesting a monotonic reduction of R&D intensity amounting to more than
3 percentage points six periods after the acquisition. The effects on merger
targets also point to a monotonic decrease of R&D intensity after the merger.
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The coefficients suggest an average reduction in the R&D intensity of approx-
imately 4 percentage points six periods after the combination.
These observations are consistent with the interpretation that merging
firms are very innovative prior to the merger, but that in the post-merger
period the incentive to invest in innovation is substantially decreased. This
points to a reduction in competitive pressure achieved by the merger, either
through the elimination of an innovative competitor or through an advantage
over competitors entailed by the advance of the acquirer’s technological port-
folio. In either way, the M&A activity in this sample has, on average, entailed
a significant reduction of the innovative efforts of the parties involved.
Literature
The literature on the effects of mergers on innovation is a large and fast-growing
field, since it receives a lot of attention from both economics and management
scholars. To keep this section concise, we will focus on rather recent con-
tributions in the economics tradition, thereby neglecting earlier studies and
corporate governance considerations.
An article closely related to this one is the study by Ornaghi (2009), which
analyzes the effect of 27 mergers in the pharmaceutical industry on various
measures of R&D inputs and outputs. A combination of propensity score
matching and difference-in-difference estimation and, alternatively, a measure
of technological relatedness is used to address issues of endogeneity. When
estimating the effects on acquirers and targets in a pooled setting, Ornaghi
finds a decrease in innovative efforts after mergers. Stiebale and Reize (2011)
report similar findings from a sample of 304 German merger targets and ex-
plicitly control for structural zeros in reported R&D values (see section and
Kleinknecht (1987)).
Desyllas and Hughes (2010) analyze a sample of 2624 acquirers in high-
tech industries using a similar empirical strategy. They find that the R&D
intensity of an acquiring firm decreases in the period after a merger (t + 1)
but increases again in the t+ 3-period. R&D productivity is not significantly
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affected. They also find evidence in favour of the view, that mergers between
technologically-related firms perform better than mergers between firms that
differ greatly with resepect to their knowledge bases. This argument is also
advanced by Cassiman et al. (2005), who distinguish between technological
and market-relatedness and use a detailed sample of 31 mergers. Contrariwise
to Desyllas and Hughes (2010), they find that technologically complementary
(substitutive) firms increase (decrease) their R&D level after the acquisition.
Moreover, effects on R&D efficiency are more advantageous in complementary
mergers.
Ahuja and Katila (2001) distinguish technological acquisitions (i.e. ac-
quisitions that are primarily technologically motivated) from nontechnological
acquisitions. Their sample consists of 72 large chemical companies, engaging in
534 acquisitions. Their analysis reveals that nontechnological acquisitions do
not significantly influence innovative output. While technological acquisitions
generally improve innovative output, the extent of the improvement depends
on the technological relatedness of the two firms in a nonlinear fashion. Cloodt
et al. (2006) extend the approach of Ahuja and Katila to four high-tech in-
dustries. Whereas their findings with respect to technological acquisitions are
largely compatible with those of Ahuja and Katila, they find that nontech-
nological acquisitions have a negative impact on innovative performance after
the merger.
Studies that find increases in R&D activity after mergers include Bertrand
(2009) and Stiebale (2010). Using a sample of 123 French acquisition targets in
crossborder mergers and a combination of propensity score and difference-in-
difference methods, Bertrand (2009) finds that R&D budgets have significantly
increased three years after the acquisition. Stiebale (2010) focuses on acquirers
(324 firms) and finds that their R&D intensity significantly increases after the
merger.
As can be seem from this brief overview, empirical studies on the effect of
mergers on R&D efforts either find a positive, negative or ambiguous relation-
ship. Therefore, no clear-cut empirical conclusions have emerged so far. Still,
most reviews of the literature (an excellent survey is provided by Veugelers
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(2006)) conclude in favour of a weak, negative relationship between M&A and
R&D.
Data & Empirical Strategy
The dataset used in this study was created by joining datasets of mergers that
were notified to either the European Commission (EC) or the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) between 1990 and 2009. These cases were reported to
the respective regulatory authority by companies from 25 different nations1
and many different product markets2 and were either cleared or subjected to
remedies by the authorities. The only common factor in all of these mergers
is that they were significant enough to meet the notification thresholds of the
EC or FTC.3 Thus the sample does not include minor asset acquisitions, which
entail no significant effect on companies, but major transactions resulting in
significant corporate restructuring under the scrutiny of one of the two most
important antitrust jurisdictions. Some of the firms in the sample merge more
than once during the observation period; to ensure that the effects of multiple
mergers do not confound the results, we drop observations where not at least
4 consecutive years lie between the acquisitions.
We combine this dataset of mergers with balance-sheet data containing the
R&D expenditures of the merging parties and other relevant variables. After
dropping all observations, for which R&D expenditures data were not available
in a time window of [t− 1, t+ 1] around the merger, we are left with 398 firms
1Most of the firms involved in these mergers have their headquarters in the US, followed
by Germany, France and the UK.
238 different 2-digit SIC codes are represented in the sample. The biggest single sector
is SIC 28 (’Chemicals and allied products’), which includes a quarter of all observations.
3A merger has to be notified to the FTC if the deal-value exceeds 60 million USD (as of
2010). The EC uses a combined criterion of at least 5,000 million Euro worldwide turnover
and at least 250 million Euro community-wide turnover, subject to further qualifications.
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(265 acquirers and 133 merger targets) for which we have full R&D data.4
When checking for the completeness of R&D data, all observations reporting
missing R&D values were dropped. We retained companies reporting zero
R&D expenditures.
This sample of merging firms was then complemented with a very large
sample of potential controls, from which the relevant control groups are con-
structed. Since the set of potential controls is more than 50 times larger than
the set of merging firms, we are confident that a sufficiently close match can
be found for each treated observation. For each of these firms we downloaded
time series of balance sheet data on total assets, income, total sales, total
debt, number of employees and R&D expenditures from the Thomson Reuters
Worldscope database. After converting all values to USD and calculating the
growth rate of R&D expenditures (defined as the percentage change in R&D
expenditures between two consecutive periods) as well as R&D intensities (the
ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales)5 and profitability (the ratio of net
income to total assets) for all firms in all periods, we logarithmize the total
assets, sales, debt, employees and R&D expenditures variables.6
A first look at the resulting dataset confirms that the mergers scrutinized
by the FTC and the EC are indeed significant in terms of size: the average
merging firm spends over 20 times more on R&D, has over 15 times more total
assets and over 10 times more employees than the average firm in the dataset.
Even when controlling for size effects by comparing R&D intensities, merging
firms exhibit significantly higher values. It thus appears that the average firm
4Notice that acquirers are overweighted in the sample. This is due to the fact that
post-merger data on targets are only available if the company continues to exist after the
acquisition.
5In some cases, R&D intensities in excess of one were found, suggesting higher R&D
expenditures than sales. Since these values are not implausible per se (most of them are
found in high-tech sectors like pharmaceuticals or biotechnology) they were kept in the
sample. To prevent any bias in the estimation coefficients due to outliers, R&D intensity
values were capped at 0.5. All results are qualitatively robust to dropping these observations.
6We add one to all values of zero (e.g. the R&D expenditures of non-innovative firms)
before taking the logarithm.
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involved in a merger, which is being scrutinized by an important competition
authority, is quite different from the average firm listed on any stock market in
the industrialized world. In consequence, when we want to infer the effect of
merging activity on innovation efforts, not any kind of non-merging comparison
group will do.
Propensity-score matching: missing data and self-selection
Studies estimating the causal effect of a treatment on a group of firms or
persons receiving said treatment face the fundamental problem of not knowing,
what would have happened in absence of the treatment. This is often called
the problem of the missing counterfactual. If we denote (following Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983)) the outcome of observation unit i receiving treatment by
r1i and the outcome in absence of treatment by r0i , the individual treatment
effect is given by
∆i = r
1
i − r0i . (1)
Since in reality only one of the possible outcomes is observed, we are con-
fronted with a missing data problem in estimating the individual treatment
effect. Experimental studies overcome this hurdle by randomly assigning one
group of observations to treatment - the treatment group -, while another group
of observations does not receive treatment, the control group. The difference
in outcome between the two groups can then be attributed to the effect of the
treatment and is called the average treatment effect (ATE):
ATEexp = E(r1i − r0i ). (2)
Non-experimental studies face the additional difficulty that an appropriate
control group is often hard to come by. Since the decision to receive treatment
is not randomly determined by an experimenter, but - in the case of mergers -
decided by the management of the firms, the assignment to treated or control
group cannot plausibly be assumed to be random. Therefore, in addition
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to the missing data problem, one also faces a problem of endogeneity or self-
selection, suggesting that the decision to receive treatment is caused by certain
firm-specific characteristics which in turn could also influence the effect of the
treatment. Not recognizing this complication could cause a systematic bias
in the estimated coefficients, since effects attributed to the treatment might
actually be due to other factors.
For example, as mentioned above, merging firms in this sample are much
larger than the average firm; not taking this fact into account might lead us
to attribute certain effects to the merger, while they actually could be a con-
sequence of the size of the firm. It is therefore necessary to construct a control
group, that has the same pre-treatment characteristics and thus the same ex-
ante probability of receiving treatment (i.e. being involved in a merger as
acquirer or target) as the group of merging firms. In non-experimental stud-
ies, the ATE needs to be calculated conditionally on the treated and control
observations not being systematically different with respect to a vector of char-
acteristics, ci:
ATEnonexp = E(r1i − r0i |ci) = E(r1i |ci)− E(r0i |ci). (3)
We thus need to artificially construct a sample, in which the decision to
engage in a merger is not driven by certain firm characteristics and hence, to the
largest extent possible, random. If successful, this both yields an appropriate
control group for the estimation of the average treatment effect and eliminates
the problem of self-selection.
Propensity-score matching: matching algorithms
The usual approach in the literature to account for the missing data and self-
selection problems is to construct a control group using propensity score match-
ing (PSM).7 The propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985)) pre-
7Other options would be to follow an instrumental variable approach or to formulate an
equation describing selection into the treatment group and estimating it jointly with the
average treatment effect by using maximum likelihood methods.
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dicts the probability of receiving treatment based on observable characteristics
using maximum likelihood estimation. By matching treated observations to
control observations based on their propensity scores one obtains two groups
that do not differ systematically with respect to the observable characteristics
the propensity score was calculated upon (see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
for the proof). PSM thus controls for the observable heterogeneity between
treated and control observations.
We follow this approach by creating separate control groups for acquirers
and targets using three different matching algorithms: nearest-neighbor match-
ing within the same year, Mahalanobis metric matching within same year and
2-digit industry code as well as (global) caliper matching. The propensity
scores are calculated using pre-merger (t-1) data to ensure that the merger ef-
fect does not influence the matching. Each matching method faces a trade-off
between variance of the estimates (depending on the size of the control group)
and bias (depending on the similarity of the control group to the treated group,
i.e. the quality of the matches).8 The following paragraphs briefly describe
the advantages and disadvantages of the three methods employed with regard
to this trade-off.
Nearest-neighbor matching
Nearest-neighbor matching is probably the most intuitive matching algorithm
we use and balances the trade-off between bias and variance: each merging
firm is matched to exactly one non-merging firm within the same year. The
match is thus the firm which is most similar to the merging firm based on
the matching covariates in the year before the merger. Since every control is
selected only once (matching without replacement), this yields a control group
of the same size as the treated group. Matching within the same year ensures
that both the treatment and the corresponding control observation refer to the
same time window.
8Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002) discuss this trade-off and
the merits of different matching approaches.
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Thus the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm effects a compromise with
respect to the trade-off described above: having exactly one control for every
treated observation ensures that the control group is not too small (variance),
restricting matching to subsamples with corresponding time entries ensures
that controls are sufficiently comparable to treated observations (bias).
Caliper matching
Matching to multiple controls within a caliper provides a larger control group
than the two other approaches, thus alleviating concerns about the variance
of the estimates. Caliper matching is implemented by matching each treated
observation to the three most similar control observations, given that none
of them differ by more than 0.025 from the treated observation’s propensity
score.9 Matching is performed without regard to temporal or industry sub-
samples; thus matches potentially are selected from different industries and/or
time periods. Picking multiple matches per treatment observation provides a
larger sample size for estimation.
Caliper matching results in a larger control group (since there are up to
three controls per treated observation) with good matching quality (since the
matches are selected from the largest posssible pool). Conversely, matches are
not pre-selected from appropriate categories as in the other two approaches.
Mahalanobis metric matching
The Mahalanobis metric approach places more emphasis on the bias aspect
than on the variance aspect: we require the control observation to be an exact
match with respect to time and industry classification. By using a full set of
2-digit SIC codes, we strongly reduce the number of available matches on the
one hand, while increasing the appropriateness of the remaining matches on
9The caliper was determined by following the suggestion of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985)
to choose a caliper size of c = 0.25s, where s =
√
s21+s
2
0
2 and s
2
1 (s20) refers to the the estimated
variance of the propensity score in the treated (control) group.
112
the other.10 Since this makes the number of available matches scarce, we allow
matching with replacement in this specification, i.e. the same control can be
assigned to multiple treated observations.
This yields a control group that is smaller than the treated group (since
matches can be recycled) and has a lower matching quality than the nearest-
neighbor matching approach (since we require exact matching in two dimen-
sions). On the other hand we know that all matches refer to the same time-
frame and are within the same industry as the corresponding treatment obser-
vation.
Propensity-score matching: results
The covariates employed in the PSM algorithm are magnitudes that could po-
tentially influence both the decision to merge and future R&D efforts, namely
pre-merger R&D intensity and growth, as well as measures of pre-merger size
and earnings (total assets, number of employees, profitability), debt and age of
the firm. Since we expect a nonlinear relationship with the age of the firm, we
also include a squared age term. The dependent variable in both regressions
is a dummy, indicating if a firm was an acquirer / a target in the following
period. We restrict all matching algorithms to the overlap of the distributions
of the propensity scores of treated and non-treated observations, that is, we
impose a common support in matching.
Table 1 reports the estimated propensity scores and shows that acquiring
firms are, on average, significantly more R&D-intensive, have more assets and
employees, a higher profitability and less debt than their non-merging peers.
R&D growth is not a significant determinant for being an acquirer. The coef-
ficients of R&D intensity, total assets and employees of targets are comparable
to those of acquirers in terms of size and significance. While the coefficient
of R&D growth is insigificant as well, there is a negative relationship between
profitability and the probability of being a merger target: merger targets are,
10We observe mergers in 38 different industries over a timespan of 20 years; this divides
the sample in 760 subsamples to match in.
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on average, significantly less profitable than other firms.11 The positive coef-
ficient of the age of the firm along with the negative coefficient of the squared
age term for both acquirers and targets suggest an inverse U-shaped relation-
ship between age and the probability to merge: the average merging firm is
neither very young nor very old.
Table 1: Propensity score estimation
Acquirers Targets
R&D Intensity 3.175∗∗∗ (0.325) 1.973∗∗∗ (0.380)
R&D Growth −0.020 (0.058) −0.094 (0.080)
Total Assets 0.231∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.239∗∗∗ (0.036)
Employees 0.189∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.132∗∗∗ (0.038)
Profitability 2.101∗∗∗ (0.260) −0.573∗∗ (0.228)
Total Debt −0.011∗ (0.007) −0.031∗∗∗ (0.007)
Age 0.030∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.006)
Age2 −0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Observations 64285 64153
Mergers 265 133
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
After matching the respective control groups using the methods described
above, we check whether a balanced sample was obtained by testing for sys-
tematic differences with respect to the covariates among treated and control
observations in all six control groups. Table 2 reports the standardized biases
before and after the respective matching procedures, as well as the reduction
in bias achieved by matching.
The standardized bias ( X¯t−X¯c
σt
, the difference in means of treatment and
control group divided by the standard deviation in the treatment group) is the
bias one incurs by comparing treated to non-treated firms. As can be seen from
the first column of table 2, the initial biases between merging and non-merging
firms are substantial.
11Gugler et al. (2003) also find that merger targets are significantly less profitable than
their acquirers.
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Both the nearest-neighbor matching and the caliper matching algorithm
largely eliminate all biases between the treated and non-treated observations.
Almost all standardized biases are reduced to below 10% (the exceptions being
the total debt of targets as well as the squared age of targets, where biases
between 11 and 13% remain), the reduction in bias mostly exceeds 90%.12
The degree of bias reduction is graphically illustrated in figure 1. None of
the remaining biases are statistically significant. Rubin (2001) and Stuart
(2010) suggest that after matching, standardized biases should not exceed 25%.
This criterion is generously met by all covariates in the nearest-neighbor and
caliper matched subsamples, allowing us to conclude that these two matching
algorithms succeed in purging all observable heterogenity between treatment
and control group: the two groups do not differ significantly with respect to
the eight covariates employed in estimation of the propensity score.
The Mahalanobis metric approach on the other hand, constrained by the
large number of subsamples matching occurs in, does not succeed in balancing
the sample; significant differences remain with respect to most matching co-
variates. Keeping this in mind, we still believe the Mahalanobis control group
has some merits over the other control groups and retain it for further analy-
sis. While it is always preferable to compare observations that are as similar
as possible, a control group made up entirely from firms within the same 2-
digit industry classification and referring to the same timeframe certainly is a
valuable counterfactual even in absence of balanced covariate distributions.
We therefore conclude that the algorithms were successful in purging the
observable heterogeneity between merging firms and non-merging firms in two
out of three cases and retain the third control group for different considerations.
Finally, we check the overlap of the three matched samples (i.e. the amount
of matches selected by one matching algorithm that coincide with those se-
lected by another matching algorithm) to get an intuition of their dissimilarity.
While there is a moderate amount of control observations selected by both the
12Lower bias reductions are achieved when i) initial biases are low (e.g. R&D intensity
of targets) or ii) the variable is not a significant determinant of the propensity score and is
therefore not subject to systematic balancing (e.g. R&D growth).
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Figure 1: Reduction in standardized bias through nearest-neighbor matching
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nearest-neighbor and the caliper algorithm (29%), the remaining overlaps are
small: 5% of the controls from the nearest-neighbor and Mahalanobis samples
and 5% of the control from the caliper and Mahalanobis samples coincide.
Structural zeros
Another possible bias arises due to the issue of structural zeros in accounting
data on R&D spending (this is addressed in Stiebale and Reize (2011)). Many
firms report zero R&D expenditures because they pursue very little or no
innovative efforts and are therefore usually excluded from analysis. Yet, by
excluding them one incurs a possible bias due to the selection into the group
of innovative firms: it cannot be ruled out, that the effect one analyzes works
systematically different on innovative firms (R&D>0) than on non-innovative
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firms (R&D=0). To avoid any such bias, this sample includes both innovative
and non-innovative firms: Almost 7% of merging firms in this sample report
zero R&D expenditures in the merger period.
Difference-in-difference strategy
After having created the relevant control groups, we proceed to estimate the
effects of mergers on the variables of interest in a difference-in-difference set-
ting.
We construct time windows around the respective merger events and use
observations of the merging firms and the relevant controls from [t − 3, t− 1]
and [t+ 1, t+ 6], where t designates the period in which the combination took
place. By using a set of dummies indicating whether a firm was involved in
a merger one year ago, two years ago and so on, we create a merger timeline,
allowing us to track the effects on innovative efforts over the time window.
In the R&D intensity regression, we include further dummies for all treated
observations (separately for acquirers and targets, equal to one in all periods)
to control for unobservable differences between the treated and control groups.
We estimate the following model
rdintij = α +
6∑
t=1
βtacquireri,j−t +
6∑
t=1
γttargeti,j−t + δ treat_acq
+ ζ treat_tar + η controls + εij (4)
The R&D intensity of firm i in year j is regressed on a set of merger
dummies ranging from the year after the merger (t = 1) up to six years after
the merger (t = 6) and indicating the role of the firm (acquirer or target),
dummies for being an acquirer / a target and controls for industry and time
effects.
In the R&D growth regression, the dependent variable is a growth rate and
thus purges individual fixed effects. We therefore exclude the acquirer/target
dummies from the regression.
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rdgrowthij = α +
6∑
t=1
βtacquireri,j−t +
6∑
t=1
γttargeti,j−t + η controls + εij (5)
In both regressions we do not include the merger period (t) to avoid the
measurement of consolidation effects.13
Even though we construct separate control groups for acquirers and tar-
gets, we estimate results jointly in a pooled setting including both targets and
acquirers as well as their respective control groups. The results when effects
on acquirers and targets are estimated separately in the respective subsamples
are very similar to those found in the pooled setting and are reported in the
appendix.
Results
Figure 2 charts the mean growth of R&D spending by acquirers and targets
around the merger. Prior to the merger (periods -2 and -1) both acquirers and
targets exhibit strong R&D growth rates of between 9 and 14 percent. In the
year of the merger, the R&D growth of acquirers jumps to almost 24% and
then strongly declines in the periods after the acquisition, with a minimum
of 2.5% growth 5 years after the merger. Since this spike in R&D growth
is a pure bookkeeping phenomenon (consolidation of R&D efforts) and not a
causal effect of the merger, we exclude period t from estimation. After this
one-period spike, the incentive of acquirers to increase innovative assets seems
to diminish.
The R&D growth of merger targets is high in the periods prior to the
acquisition, but starts dropping immediately in the period of the merger. From
t − 1 to t + 2, R&D growth declines monotonically from more than 10% to
13Since R&D intensity is the ratio of two variables that are both similarly affected by
consolidation effects, it would not be strictly necessary to drop t in the R&D intensity re-
gressions. While all results are robust to the inclusion of t, the set of results reported excludes
the merger period in order to increase the comparability to the R&D growth regressions.
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about 1%. After t+ 2, R&D growth starts to increase again, without reaching
its former level in the observation period. It thus seems, that the acquisition
creates a slump in the target’s R&D growth profile and that a substantial
recovery period is needed to return to the former growth path.
Figure 2: R&D growth of acquirers and targets around the merger
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Figure 3 reports the R&D intensity (equal to total R&D spending divided
by total sales) of acquirers and targets from two years before until six years
after the merger. Prior to the merger, the R&D intensity of acquirers is rel-
atively constant around a high level of 6.5%. Acquirers are, therefore, on
average quite R&D-intensive firms. This remains unchanged in the period of
the merger and the one after it. From t+ 1 to t+ 6 we observe a monotonous
decline in the R&D intensity of acquirers, which drops from 6.7% to 4.6%.
This effect is not due to consolidation, since R&D and sales are both consol-
idated. Thus, R&D intensity is reduced by almost a third on average in the
five years after an acquisition is made. A similar, but even stronger pattern
can be observed in the R&D intensity of merger targets: while starting out
at an very high level of about 8%, the graph monotonically decreases to 5%
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in the post-merger periods, suggesting a reduction in R&D intensity of more
than a third.
From figures 2 and 3 it appears that merger targets are chosen on the basis
of being very innovative firms - they exhibit high R&D growth and intensity
-, but that their innovative efforts decrease substantially after the acquisition.
A similar claim could be made for the buying firms. It thus appears that
the incentive to invest in innovation is substantially reduced in post-merger
periods.
Figure 3: R&D intensity of acquirers and targets around the merger
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While these two figures suggest that certain changes in innovative behaviour
occur around a merger, they contain only mean R&D growth and intensity of
acquirers and targets, which do not permit inferences as to the significance
or causality of the observed phenomena. To achieve this, we run regressions
in a difference-in-difference setting (see section ) within the relevant control
group (see section ). The dependent variables are R&D growth and intensity
respectively. All regressions are reported in a (acquirers and targets) pooled
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setting14 in the three different samples obtained by nearest-neighbor, caliper
and Mahalanobis matching. All specifications include controls for industry and
time effects (not reported). The R&D intensity regression includes two further
dummies, which control for unobserved differences of acquirers / targets and
the control group.15 The results are reported in tables 3 and 4.
In table 3, the regression results for acquirers in the nearest-neighbor sam-
ple show no significant deviation from the control group in all periods except
for t+5, when acquirers experience significantly lower R&D growth. The same
is found in the other two samples, which also show significantly negative effects
in t + 3 and t + 4 (caliper matching) and t + 2 through t + 4 (Mahalanobis
matching).
The growth effects on targets are much more clear-cut: in all periods from
t + 1 to t + 4 and all three samples, merger targets experience lower R&D
growth than their peers, significant at the 1% level. The significance of this
result drops slightly in t + 5 and disappears in t + 6. Thus the R&D growth
of merger targets is significantly lower than that of the control group for the
five year period after the acquisition has occured.
The p-values reported at the bottom of the table test the null hypothesis
that the sum of all acquirer (or target) timeline-dummy coefficients is not
significantly different from zero. Since all of these hypotheses can be rejected
at the 1% level, we conclude that the aggregate effect on R&D growth over the
six periods following a combination is significantly negative for both acquirers
and targets, but more so for targets.
Turning to the regression addressing R&D intensity, we find that the R&D
intensity of acquirers is significantly affected by a merger: while the difference
to the control group is insignificant in period t + 1 (and the periods prior
to it), all coefficients are significantly negative from periods t + 2 until t + 6
in all three samples. The coefficients indicate a cumulative reduction of R&D
14As mentioned before, all results qualitatively hold when estimating effects on targets
and acquirers separately; see appendix.
15These dummies are not included in the R&D growth regression, since the growth rate
specification purges time-constant unobserved fixed effects.
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intensity amounting to 2.8 to 3.5 percentage points in comparison to the control
groups in all three samples.
The effects on merger targets are qualitatively similar; although the reduc-
tion in R&D intensity seems to be even more pronounced, the standard errors
of the coefficients are higher than those of the acquirers, pointing to a wider
range of possible outcomes. In all three samples the timeline dummies are
negative throughout and indicate significant deviations from the control group
from t+ 2 through t+ 6 in the nearest-neighbor and caliper samples. Signifi-
cances are slightly lower in the Mahalanobis sample. The implied reduction in
R&D intensity ranges between 3.7 and 4.4 percentage points after six periods.
In the pooled settings reported here, the generally lower level of R&D
intensity among acquirers and their control group is offset by significantly
positive target dummies in two of the three samples.
Similarly to the R&D growth regressions, we report the p-values of the
hypothesis that the sum of all period effects is not significantly different from
zero. Most null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% level (those tested in the
Mahalanobis sample can only be rejected at the 5% level) suggesting that the
R&D intensities of acquirers and targets are significantly negatively affected
in the six periods after a merger.
Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated the effect of M&A activity on the growth of
R&D spending as well as R&D intensity of the parties involved, using a sample
of merger cases that went under the scrutiny of either the EC or the FTC. In
doing so, we have explicitly recognized the roles of the firms involved as either
buying firms or merger targets and have evaluated the impact on both groups
separately, using appropriately constructed control groups.
In terms of merger mechanics, the results suggest, that merger targets are
chosen on the basis of being highly innovative firms, as indicated by an average
pre-merger R&D intensity of over 8%. The fact that the probability of being
a target is negatively related to profitability (as indicated by the propensity
125
score regression) supports the conjecture, that these firms have not yet been
able to reap the profit of their innovative efforts. Acquirers thus seem to
cherry-pick firms with attractive technological portfolios, that have not yet
been fully commercially exploited. Acquirers themselves, on the other hand,
are primarily characterised by being both large and profitable.
We find that the mergers in this sample entail a significant negative effect
on the R&D efforts of firms in the subsequent periods. Specifically, looking at
mean R&D intensities over time, we find that the R&D intensity of acquirers
six years after the acquisition has dropped by almost a third compared to its
pre-merger level, while the R&D intensity of merger targets decreases by more
than a third. We corroborate these findings in a difference-in-difference setting,
where the evolution of merging firms’ R&D intensity is contrasted with that
of appropriate control groups. While the effects on both groups (acquirers
and targets) are unambiguously negative, the effects on acquirers are more
significant.
The mergers in this sample also entail detrimental R&D growth effects on
both acquirers and targets: while the R&D stock of merger targets accumulates
significantly slower than that of the control group in all periods until five years
after the merger, this is only true in some periods for acquiring firms. Thus,
while both groups of firms experience negative effects in terms of R&D growth
as well as R&D intensity, the growth effects are more pronounced on targets,
while the intensity effects primarily affect buying firms. This finding can be
explained by the fact that average acquirers experience a substantial increase
in sales after the merger, whereas they increase their R&D spending only very
modestly.
From the point of view of a policy-maker that aims to maximize the well-
being of consumers it seems distressing that the average effect of a business
combination in a sample consisting of acquisitions that are very diverse in na-
ture, but major in size is unambiguously negative to such an extent. Compe-
tition authorities are traditionally reluctant to consider the effects of a merger
on innovative activity, since such effects are hard to quantify, particularly from
an ex-ante perspective. However, given that the findings of the literature on
126
the effects of M&A on R&D are predominantly negative, it would seem de-
sirable to find a way to incorporate such considerations into the evaluation of
notified mergers.
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Abstract
The present dissertation is concerned with the empirical evaluation of compe-
tition policy and its implications for competition and efficiency. It comprises
three articles, summarized in the following paragraphs:
An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform
Based on a database of 326 merger cases scrutinized by the European Com-
mission (EC) between 1990 and 2007, we evaluate the economic impact of the
change in European merger legislation in 2004. We first propose a general
framework to assess merger policy effectiveness, which is based on standard
oligopoly theory and makes use of stock market reactions as an external as-
sessment of the merger and the merger control decision. We then focus on four
different dimensions of effectiveness: 1) legal certainty; 2) frequency and de-
terminants of type I and type II errors; 3) rent-reversion achieved by different
merger policy tools; and 4) deterrence of anti-competitive mergers. To infer
the economic impact of the merger policy reform, we compare the results of
our four tests before and after its introduction. Our results suggest that the
more economics based approach of the EC resulted in a better identification of
problematic cases, however, the fact that the EC essentially stopped blocking
mergers does not seem to be well grounded.
Investigating Transatlantic Merger Policy Convergence
We propose a framework to examine tendencies of convergence in the jurisdic-
tional patterns of the American FTC and the European Commission. Based
on a sample of 493 merger cases scrutinized by on of these agencencies in the
1999 - 2007 period, we calibrate logit models of the probability of intervening
in a merger for both jurisdictions and use them to predict the decisions of the
respectively other agency. The results point to an increasing harmonization of
merger policies and corroborate the theoretical appraisal, that the 2004 reform
of EU merger law constituted a step towards the US system.
132
M&A and R&D: Asymmetric Effects on Acquirers and Targets?
We evaluate the impact of M&A activity on the growth of R&D spending
and R&D intensity of 265 acquiring firms and 133 merger targets in the time
period ranging from 1990 to 2009. We use a range of matching techniques to
construct separate control groups for acquirers and targets and use appropriate
difference-in-difference estimation methods to single out the causal effect of
mergers on R&D growth and intensity. We find a significant reduction of
R&D efforts by both acquirers and targets in the periods after the merger,
pointing to a decrease of the incentive to innovate.
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der empirischen Evaluierung
rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen im Wettbewerbsrecht und ist in drei Artikel
gegliedert.
Der erste Artikel (gemeinsam mit Tomaso Duso und Klaus Gugler) unter-
sucht die ökonomischen Auswirkungen einer Reform des europäischen Wettbe-
werbsrechts im Jahr 2004. Anhand einer Stichprobe von 326 Fusionen, welche
im Zeitraum von 1990 bis 2007 von der europäischen Kommission evaluiert
wurden, wird die Effizienz des Wettbewerbsrechts vor und nach der Reform ver-
glichen, wobei die Effizienz der Jurisdiktion in vier Dimensionen (Rechtssicher-
heit, Entscheidungsfehler, Reversion antikompetitiver Renten und Abschreck-
ungseffekte) untersucht wird. Dabei zeigt sich, daß der durch die Reform
erhöhte Fokus auf ökonomische Analyse in Fusionen nur bedingt Erfolg zeigt.
Der zweite Artikel widmet sich der Frage, ob die Wettbewerbspolitik der
Europäischen Kommission und der amerikanischen Federal Trade Commission
im Zeitraum von 1999 bis 2007 Tendenzen der Konvergenz aufweisen. Hierzu
werden empirische Modelle der beiden Jurisdiktionen kalibriert, die dann ver-
wendet werden um die Entscheidungen der jeweils anderen Behörde zu prognos-
tizieren. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, daß nach einer Periode steigender
Inkongruenz zu Beginn des Jahrtausends die Reform des europäischen Fusion-
srechts zu einer weitgehenden Angleichung der beiden Rechtssysteme geführt
hat.
Der dritte Artikel untersucht, inwiefern Fusionen die Innovationsbemühun-
gen der beteiligten Firmen beeinflußen. Konkret wird dabei eine Stichprobe fu-
sionierender Firmen mit einer abgestimmten Kontrollgruppe nicht-fusionieren-
der Firmen komplementiert und auf diese Weise der kausale Effekt der Fusion
auf Forschungsausgaben und -intensität isoliert. Es zeigt sich, daß fusion-
ierende Firmen ihre Innovationsbemühungen in den Jahren nach einer Fusion
deutlich reduzieren.
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